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How Bad Boys Turn Good: The Role of Law in Transforming
Criminal Organizations Into Legitimate Entities by
Making Rehabilitation An Economic Necessity
Igor V. Dubinsky*
"-You once told me: 'In five years the Corleone family will be com-
pletely legitimate.' That was seven years ago.
-I know. I'm trying, darling."
-THE GODFATHER PART Ill
I. INTRODUCTION
The old adage: "crime does not pay" is incorrect. Crime pays and
pays extremely well, but at some point lawful actions pay more.2 Most
people have asked: How does crime arise? What are its roots? Why
do people become criminals? This article asks a different question:
Why do criminals become law-abiding? And more specifically, why
and when do criminal organizations metamorphose into legal
businesses?
The lifespan of a criminal entity is like that of a butterfly. It begins
life as a petty criminal larva, matures into an opaque organizational
cocoon, and if the legal and economic weather is right, metamorpho-
ses into a legitimate adult creature-assuming the justice mechanism
does not eat it first.
Criminal organizations reach a point where it becomes more profit-
able to become a legitimate business organization than to continue to
exist as a criminal entity. By understanding how and when this trans-
formation happens, legal mechanisms can be structured to reduce
crime, increase economic productivity, provide for integration of oth-
erwise unavailable resources into the economy, and supply a criminal/
* B.A.: Integrated Science, Advanced Physics, and Molecular/Genetic Biology, 2004, North-
western University; J.D. Candidate, May 2007: DePaul University College of Law. I would like
to thank my parents, Larisa and Vladimir, who have always been my role models and whose
unwavering commitment to education and freedom has always served as a source of inspiration.
I would also like to thank Professor Michael Jacobs for his support and review of my work. I am
also indebted to my friends and colleagues for the many useful comments and suggestions pro-
vided during the early drafts of this article. The ideas and opinions expressed in this article are
of course solely those of the author. The author may be contacted at igor.dubinsky@gmail.com.
1. Paramount Pictures (1974).
2. As G. Gordon Liddy said, "Obviously crime pays, or there'd be no crime."
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commercial law structure for developing nations. Concomitantly, pol-
icy should focus on providing strong incentives against commission of
crimes, and at the same time promote conversion of illegal enterprises
into legitimate ones.
In 1066 A.D., England was a relatively advanced society with one of
the most sophisticated systems of governance in Western Europe in-
cluding an established national tax system, and a developed system of
courts and laws. 3 When Norman invaders (Vikings who had settled in
France) swept through English lands that year, they pillaged, plun-
dered, and sought power to fill their needs.4 Yet after years of looting
and destruction, the Norman raiders integrated into the structure and
governance of the English civilization. 5
By 1135, England had transformed from its pre-Norman days into a
centralized monarchy with feudal obligations, a nationwide census,
and a centralized accounting system, becoming one of the most effi-
cient and respected nations on the European continent. 6 Much like
the Roman invasion of Greece centuries earlier, what began as a crim-
inal onslaught against an advanced society actually transformed and
integrated the invaders. More importantly, it advanced the society as
a whole through the introduction of knowledge, power, and new re-
sources.7 A similar trend occurs today in modern criminal
organizations.
"Human behavior is economic behavior. The particulars may vary,
but competition for limited resources remains a constant." Need, as
well as greed, lie at the foundation of our modus operandi and the
rewards of a better and more efficient legal system still await those
wise enough to recognize this deep thrumming of our common pulse.8
The law constrains the way we achieve our goals of maximizing eco-
nomic profitability-breaking the law has a price, but getting away
with it has its rewards. On the whole, criminal organizations are "eco-
3. MARJORIE CHIBNALL, THE DEBATE ON THE NORMAN CONQUEST (Manchester University
Press 1999).
4. THE KINGFISHER HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA 132 (Miranda Smith ed., Kingfisher Publica-
tions 2004).
5. Id. at 131.
6. United Kingdom: Henry 1 (1100-35), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, at http://
www.britannica.com/eb/article-44775/United-Kingdom (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
7. See THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF GREEK AND ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Christopher
Rowe & Malcom Schofield eds., Cambridge University Press 2000). The Romans were cultur-
ally barbarian, but strong militarily. The Greeks were very much the opposite. See id. Yet when
Rome conquered Greece, it integrated the Greek culture and innovations into its own society,
thereby lifting its civilization as a whole and advancing the rate of scientific and political progress
for the newly formed Greco-Roman empire. See id.
8. SID MEIER'S ALPHA CENTAURI (Firaxis Games 1999).
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nomically rational" entities that seek to maximize profitability and re-
duce costs-they are not in it for the kill, they are in it for the dough. 9
The famous bank robber Willy Sutton explained this well when asked
why he robbed banks: "because that's where the money is."10
Yet laws are often arbitrary; whichever moral majority is in control
often attempts to pass through its version of morality.' To some, the
Mafia is destroying the American way of life; to others, it is simply
another avenue of private contract enforcement.' 2 As the Prohibition
experiment taught the United States, many laws are not necessarily
moral simply because they are laws; in fact, laws often change with the
winds of time.' 3 This is by no means an endorsement of moral relativ-
ism or crime. Rather, in order to conduct a full evaluation of the
above-described phenomenon we must temporarily dispense with our
moral revulsion at breaking "the law" and instead look at such con-
duct through an economic lens.
Economic rationality-conducting an action only if the expected
benefits outweigh the expected costs-applies to criminals small and
large. For example, if robbers wanted to prove how strong they were
during robberies, they would pick on football players. Instead they
rob little old grandmas because the associated costs and risks are
much less.14 This calculation is even more precise in larger criminal
organization as they are better able to predict the outcome of an ac-
tion as well as the actions effects on future profits and survivability of
9. A criminal organization does what it does for the same reason that Wal-Mart or General
Motors do what they do: because the organization's skills can maximize its profits by operating
within its particular industry. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAw's ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS
TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 8 (Princeton University Press 2000); see also Richard
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998)
(explaining rational choice theory as choosing the best means to the chooser's ends. However,
rationality does not imply omniscience. In fact, it would be irrational to spend all of one's time
acquiring information.). Id. at 1553. Additionally, this term is economic only and is not con-
cerned with ethics or morality.
10. Federal Bureau of Investigation - FBI History - Famous Cases, at http://www.fbi.gov/
libref/historic/famcases/sutton/sutton.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
11. See DIEGO GAMBElT-A, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE PROTECION 5
(Harvard University Press 1993) (1996) (quoting Sicilian scholar Santi Romano: "we all know
how arbitrary, contingent, and variable are the criteria with which the state rules on the legality
or illegality of some associations").
12. See, e.g., Ian Angell, Economic Crime: Beyond Good and Evil, 4 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLI-
ANCE, available at http://www.sgrm.com/art25.htm (arguing that organized crime has a sharper
sense of community and citizenship than the politicians who prohibit them; "[wihen a mafia
family runs a neighborhood, little old ladies don't get mugged on the street").
13. See generally Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Over-
criminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997).
14. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT 134 (2d ed. South-West-
ern Publishing Co. 1990).
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the organization. 15 This article will focus on the business structure of
a mafia-a multi-faceted business organization that provides illicit
goods and services-as an example of the furthest progression of a
criminal entity on its way to becoming legal. 16
This article will extrapolate from the legal and economic history of
some of the major criminal organizations and the national and inter-
national attempts to control them. Accounting for the mafia's costs
and profitability, as well as examining and applying commercial laws
on historic and hypothetical grounds, will help determine where and
when this metamorphosis occurs. The threshold at which this trans-
formation will take place for various types of criminal businesses will
differ depending on the laws, their enforcement, and the types of
goods or services produced. Nonetheless, determining this range
should enable legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts to craft
optimal laws and regulations to deter crime and provide an incentive
for criminal organizations to "rehabilitate."1 7
Part II provides a general background to the business of crime,
black markets, and criminal organizations. Part III analyzes the spe-
cific costs and benefits associated with an illegal enterprise that distin-
guish it from its legal corporate counterpart. Part IV examines the
role and structure of law in facilitating this metamorphosis and Part V
provides examples of such metamorphoses in three different coun-
tries. Part VI proposes policy and strategy through which the law
should facilitate this transformation. Part VII concludes this article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Business of Criminal Organizations is Business
1. What is wrong with criminal businesses in the first place?
From an economic standpoint, crime is inefficient because it wastes
resources through rent-seeking. Rent-seeking occurs when people
spend resources transferring or preventing the transfer of wealth from
15. See e.g., HOWARD ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME 182 (Allyn and Bacon, Inc. 1981)
(quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZED
CRIME 37-39 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1975)).
16. While some commentators restrict the definition of a mafia as an organization that only
provides protection services, e.g., GAMBETrA, supra note 11, this is an artificial restriction.
Mafias are generally involved in all kinds of illegal goods and services trade including drugs,
protection, prostitution, loan-sharking, and numerous others. PETER REUTER, DISORGANIZED
CRIME: THE ECONOMICS OF THE VISIBLE HAND 119-20 (The MIT Press 1986).
17. The analysis applied in this paper is for mafias and other criminal enterprises. However, it
should also be possible to apply a similar, wider-scoped, analysis to criminal organizations such
as terrorist groups; though this is outside the scope of this paper.
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others to themselves. 18 For example, if you know I have $500 and you
rob me, the robbery only transfers the wealth from me to you. But if I
know that someone will try to rob me, I will invest resources to deter
the robbery (i.e. I will buy guns, locks, and safes, for $100). In re-
sponse, you will expend additional resources (i.e. you will purchase
bigger guns, lock picks, and facemasks for $100). Thus, in this transfer
of wealth there are resources lost with no net benefit produced. 19 The
resources shifted to locksmiths and gun manufacturers could have
been used more productively.
Crime is bad for me; I have now lost $500. Crime is bad for society;
society has lost resources that could have been better employed else-
where. But crime is good for the thief-he has gained $500 and only
spent $100. If laws exist to prevent this crime (and are applied effec-
tively and result in real penalties) then the thief will only do the crime
if he estimates his costs to be smaller than the "profits." In other
words, if the thief predicts that there is a 41% chance that he could get
caught and have to pay a $1,000 fine and he is risk neutral, then his
expected value for the costs in the crime is $510 ($410 fine and $100
costs of robbery devices) and he will not steal the $500 from me. 20
While individual thieves may not undertake this exact balancing every
time, larger criminal business organizations will, because in determin-
ing which line of business to pursue they do not survive by the short
term theft in the alley, but rather through long-term transactions. 21
2. Black Markets
An illegal enterprise exists because its owners judge it more profita-
ble for the enterprise to operate in black markets, trafficking prohib-
ited goods or services than to engage in an alternate business. 22 Such
organizations act as "large-scale continuing firm[s] with the internal
18. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 33.
19. See id.; see also, e.g., Serguey Braguinsky, Enforcement of Property Rights During the Rus-
sian Transition: Problems and Some Approaches to a New Liberal Solution, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
515, 517 (1999) (describing how crime leads to financial freeloading and dissipation of value
produced in the resource extraction sector).
20. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 9 (emphasizing profit maximization in criminal
organizations).
21. See, e.g., GAMBETrA, supra note 11, at 158 (arguing that forms of behavior traditionally
associated with the Mafia, such as their rituals, symbols, and ceremonies, can all be explained by
an economic theory of private protection as rational responses to customer demand; the mafia
needs to convince potential customers of the quality of the products that they provide, i.e. pro-
tection, in order to gain legitimacy).
22. See Nora V. Demleitner, Organized Crime and Prohibition: What Difference Does Legali-
zation Make?, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 614 (1994) (viewing organized crime as a rational re-
sponse to the demand for illicit goods and/or services).
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organization of a large enterprise, and with a conscious effort to con-
trol the market. '23 These enterprises provide risk prevention (e.g.
forcing competitors out of business), underground contractual en-
forcement mechanisms, black market commodities (e.g. illegal drugs,
weapons, pharmaceuticals), and black market services (e.g. gambling,
prostitution, murder).24 Illegality does not eliminate the trade in the
good or service. Legal rules are subservient to the law of the market-
place-where there is a high enough demand, a supply will exist.25
Illicitness simply raises the costs of providing the good or service, ar-
guably destroys some of the demand, 26 and raises the price compared
to what it would have been in a legal, perfectly competitive market.27
By forcing a market underground, society in effect grants a monop-
oly to the entity or entities willing to undertake the risk of being
caught and prosecuted.28 This monopoly is characterized by high,
government-made barriers to entry, an often inelastic demand for the
good, and a rapid response to demand fluctuations.29 For example,
when one town in the former Soviet Union allowed extra clothing to
be allocated to people with recently deceased relatives, a market for
counterfeit death certificates sprang up overnight.30 Additionally,
black market goods and services profit from avoiding royalties to the
government-taxes-while suffering from high costs related to avoid-
23. Id. at 616 (quoting ANNELISE ANDERSON, THE BUSINESS OF ORGANIZED CRIME: A COSA
NOSTRA FAMILY 10 (1979)).
24. See, e.g., JAMES 0. FINCKENAUER & YURI A. VORONIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE THREAT OF RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME 5, 7,20 (2001), available at http:/
/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/187085.pdf.
25. See Steven Wisotsky, Beyond the War on Drugs, in THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE
103, 107 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1991).
26. Destruction of demand is arguable because, while illegality deters those people who would
have committed the deed but for its illegal status, it also spurs on those who would not have
cared to do it but now will because it is "the forbidden fruit."
27. See Gary Becker et al., The Economic Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs 4 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10976, 2004), available at http://ww.nber.org/
papers/w10976 (relating demand for illegal goods to marginal profits, costs imposed on traffick-
ers through enforcement and punishment, and costs imposed on users by the government). A
perfect market is one characterized by a very large number of buyers and sellers of a homogene-
ous product where entry and exit from the industry is nearly costless and information is freely
available to all market participants. BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF ACCOUNTING TERMS 337 (4th
ed. 2005).
28. Demleitner, supra note 22, at 616-17. While some competition may exist in illicit markets,
most entities in such markets use violence to force competitors out of business or divide and
cartelize a territory. See infra LEVIT & DUBNER note 35 and accompanying text.
29. See Alan S. Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors, Thoughts About
the Transitioning Market Economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Address
at the Kellstadt Graduate School of Business at DePaul University (1994), in 6 DEPAUL BUS.
L.J. 1, 8 n.18 (1994).
30. Id.
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ing discovery and prosecution.31 This results in hyper-inflated prices
for the illicit good or service and provides the "entrepreneur" with a
monopoly. 32
Yet even an underground business must still operate as close as pos-
sible to the guidelines of the law-the further it deviates, the higher its
costs. Destruction and gang wars may look like fun in movies, but
they are generally unprofitable and cause increased prosecutions. 33 In
both legal and illegal markets, "[t]he best of all monopoly profits is a
quiet life."'34
Instead of attempting competition in the same area, criminal orga-
nizations split up territories establishing cartels and geographic mo-
nopolies.35 For example, it may be easier to kill a rival-drug selling
mafia than to engage in product competition (manufacturing higher
quality and cheaper drugs), but if this will lead to government prose-
cutions, rival mafia wars, or increased police enforcement, it may be
cheaper to instead cartelize the industry or divide up the territory be-
tween the various suppliers. 36 The more murders the mafia commits,
the more police and judges it has to bribe, and the more witnesses it
has to kill. For example, when a Chicago drug ring leader was asked
by one of his subordinates why he could not just shoot and kill com-
petitors, he explained: "you've got to belong to a serious organiza-
tion-you can't just tear [things] up. It's bad for business. ' 37 Thus a
mafia behaves just like any other profit maximizing organization-
seeking to minimize its costs and maximize its profits. However, un-
like a legal organization, the mafia will use illegal means if the ex-
pected profits from those means are more than the expected profits
from their legal counterparts. 38 As one Mafioso eloquently said in
31. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 278-79 (Stanford Uni-
versity Press 1968); see also Demleitner, supra note 22, at 617.
32. Demleitner, supra note 22, at 617.
33. See Achim Wennmann, The Political Economy of Transnational Crime and Its Implications
for Armed Violence in Georgia, 6 INSIGHT TURKEY 2, April-June 2004, at 108, available at http://
www.cimera.org/sources/105-117.pdf.
34. J. R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935).
35. See, e.g., STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 107 (2005) (describ-
ing the absence of gang drug wars in California as a mafia dictated cost minimization technique).
36. See id.
37. Id. at 108.
38. In fact, even legal organizations perform similar cost benefit analysis. For example, when
the realized benefits from pollution exceed the anticipated civil costs imposed by the EPA and
the loss of public goodwill, a company will oftentimes choose to pollute and pay the fine (as a
Pigouvian tax), rather than perform a proper disposal or cleanup. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at
29. See e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (where the court
2007]
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Mario Puzo's Godfather, "I don't like violence ... I'm a businessman;
blood is a big expense. '39
B. International Scope of Illegal Entities
Historically, mafias have been national entities, controlling the
trade in illegal markets within a country.4° Over the past forty years
the international markets in human, drug, and weapons trafficking
have seen a globalization of the mafia and increased cooperation and
negotiation between nationally based mafia structures. 41 Some of the
world's most influential mafias: the Russian (whose yearly turnover is
$200 billion);42 the Japanese (which is so intertwined with the state
that prosecutions now seldom occur); 43 the Chinese (whose range of
operations has expanded immensely);44 and the Sicilian (the oldest
mafia in existence) 45 have increased their presence in countries lack-
ing the necessary laws and enforcement resources to raise the cost of
illegal activities.46 Conversely, the American mafias, such as the Cosa
Nostra, while still in existence, have had their influence and opera-
tions greatly curtailed 47 and are negligible by comparison. 48
Yet, while most countries recognize that mafias utilize an organiza-
tional structure similar to that of a corporation, few countries deploy
the full arsenal of economic means to raise the enterprise's costs and
lower its benefits.49 To understand where such weaponry would be
allowed a $45 million cement plant to pollute the air and reimburse private parties downwind
rather than shut the plant down).
39. Paramount Pictures (1972).
40. FELIA ALLUM & RENATE SIEBERT, ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOC-
RACY 56 (Routledge 2003).
41. Id.
42. Larry D. Newman, RICO and the Russian Mafia: Toward a New Principle Under Interna-
tional Law, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP L. REV. 225, 227 (1998).
43. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering, 67 U. CH. L.
REV. 41, 72 (2000).
44. See generally Yiu-Kong Chu, International Triad Movements: The Threat of Chinese Or-
ganized Crime, 291 CONFLICT STUD. (1996).
45. James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P. Gouldin, Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter? 25 CRIME & JUST.
129, 139 (1999); see also Sara Jankiewicz, Glasnost and the Growth of Global Organized Crime,
18 Hous. J. INrr'L L. 215, 218 (1995).
46. Joseph E. Ritch, They'll Make an Offer You Can't Refuse: A Comparative Analysis of Int'l
Organized Crime, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 569, 599 (2002).
47. Brian Goodwin, Civil Versus Criminal RICO and the "Eradication" of La Cosa Nostra 28
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279, 280 (2002).
48. JAMES 0. F1NCKENAUER & ELIN J. WARING, RUSSIAN MAFIA IN AMERICA: IMMIGRA-
TION, CULTURE, AND CRIME 275-77 (Northeastern University Press 1998).
49. "The major difference between the diagram of an organized crime family and the chart of
a major corporation is that the head of the enterprise-the Boss-does not have a box over him
labeled "stockholder." Many of the other boxes are paralleled in the underworld. Ralph Sa-
lerno and John S. Tompkins, The Crime Confederation. 84-5 (1969). (The author of that state-
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most useful, the next section will analyze exactly where the mafia's
costs and revenues lie.
III. ANALYSIS OF MAFIA COSTS AND REVENUES
A. Introduction
Effective punishment raises the costs of the good or service, but
also increases profits to efficient sellers who are skilled in secrecy and
can avoid detection. 50 Yet, as marginal costs of production and expan-
sion reach equilibrium with the marginal benefits received from an-
other marginal sale or territory expansion, the mafia finds itself
naturally limited to a certain size. For example, if expansion necessi-
tates bribing a higher official, whose protection yields less than the
profits that can be realized from the expanded output or territory, the
organization will forego expansion.5 1
At this threshold point, expansion in that line of business is no
longer economically profitable. This limitation on size will depend on
the legal atmosphere, the degree of enforcement of the laws, and the
economic rate of return in legal markets. As size limitations make
reinvesting illicit profits into existing businesses unprofitable, excess
capital will flow into other lines of business. Where legal channels
present higher rate of returns than illegal ones, there will be a move-
ment of the mafia toward legal enterprise.52 This economic "rehabili-
tation" occurs where established underground organizational
structures can be converted to overworld edifices with minimum cost
and maximum profit.
ment was a New York City police officer and a consultant to the Task Force on Organized
Crime).
50. Becker, supra note 27, at 11. See also Milton Friedman, An Open Letter to Bill Bennett,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 7, 1989, available at http://www.fff.org/freedom/0490e.asp, which states:
You are not mistaken in believing that drugs are a scourge that is devastating our soci-
ety .... [T]he problem is demand ... that must operate through repressed and illegal
channels. Illegality creates obscene profits that finance the murderous tactics of the
drug lords; illegality leads to the corruption of law enforcement officials; illegality
monopolizes the efforts of honest law forces so that they are starved for resources to
fight the simpler crimes of robbery, theft and assault. Drugs are a tragedy for addicts.
But criminalizing their use converts that tragedy into a disaster for society, for users
and non-users alike. Our experience with the prohibition of drugs is a replay of our
experience with the prohibition of alcoholic beverages.
51. See e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRuIlON AND GOVERNMENT 83 (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1999) (describing a bribery model where high level officials decide to allow illegal
activities only if the bribe is high enough to account for their risk).
52. See e.g., Vadim Volkov, Security and Rule-Enforcement in Russian Business: The Role of
the "Mafia" and the State, 1999 PONARS POL'Y MEMO 79, available at http://www.csis.org/media/
csis/pubs/pm_0079.pdf (describing the shift of some of the biggest Russian mafias into legal
national corporations).
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This section will analyze the costs and benefits of a mafia organiza-
tion. Part B will analyze the general costs associated with such an
illicit entity and develop a general formula for the profit structure of a
criminal organization. Part C will analyze the bribery costs to which
illegal businesses are subject. Part D will address laundering costs
while part E will analyze the agency costs (e.g., costs incurred due to
different goals of management and workers within the organization)
and the costs of monitoring information flow within the secret organi-
zation. Part F will analyze the costs that the mafia incurs because of
legal prosecution of its employees and management, and address
other costs facing the illegal enterprise.
B. General Costs
An enterprise's costs are both fixed and variable. Fixed costs for an
illicit business include, for example, capital invested into facilities such
as cocaine fields and warehouses, transportation vehicles such as
planes and trucks, and lodgings such as prostitution bordellos and
gambling houses.5 3 The variable costs include production costs such
as growing the cocaine, or training low-level thugs to provide extorted
protection of the businesses; distribution costs such as the importation
and distribution of narcotics or the daily patrols of thugs around the
neighborhood; secrecy costs such as bribes, enforcement of a code of
silence, inability to structure the organization at optimal bureaucratic
levels and grow past a certain size to prevent detection; and punish-
ment costs such as laundering fees and jail times.
The main cost that illegal organizations incur, which the legal ones
do not, is secrecy. The illicit nature of the enterprise balances on the
razor's edge of concealment. For example, until the 1950s little if any
information was available on the inside workings of the U.S. mafia,
and informants often turned up dead.54 In fact, while secrecy costs
exist in legal organizations in the form of trade secrets and proprietary
information, 55 the main difference between the two is that legal orga-
nizations hide their information from private market competitors,
whereas the mafia hides theirs from public sector's enforcers. Thus,
secrecy is the primary cost that distinguishes an illicit enterprise from
its legal counterpart and its presence primarily affects the transforma-
53. Cf LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 35, at 101 (describing the costs incurred by a drug gang:
wholesale cost of drugs, licensing fees, mercenary fighter costs, and weapons costs).
54. Jacobs & Gouldin, supra note 45, 131.
55. GAMBETrA, supra note 11, at 39.
[Vol. 5:379
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tion threshold. 56 Secrecy costs can be divided into four main parts:
bribery costs, laundering costs, agency costs, and other costs.
C. Bribery Costs
When buying and selling are regulated, the first things to be bought
and sold are the regulators.5 7 Secure operation of an illegal business is
ensured by bribes to officials at various levels, including the police,
judges, and politicians. 58 Not only can bribes be used to obtain immu-
nity from prosecution, they can also be used to assure monopoly
power in the illegal market by convincing officials to raid competitors.
An effective bribe, therefore, leaves the bribing organization free to
operate with impunity. 59 In other words, an illicit organization out-
sources part of its secrecy responsibility to officials within the public
sector.
A bribe is a bilateral transaction in which the two participants ex-
change secrecy for money, yet most economic and legal literature
deals with bribes solely from the point of view of the bribe giver (the
briber). 60 While the briber's incentives must be considered, an "eco-
nomically rational" government official (the bribee)61 should only ac-
cept a bribe if the expected revenue (the bribe) exceeds the expected
costs. The expected costs are the probability of detection multiplied
by the discounted cash flow of that position's income, minus the ex-
pected income after detection, plus the probability of detection multi-
plied by the expected fine (money and/or jail time) that will be
imposed on the government official if he is detected.62 Therefore let:
56. See e.g., BECKER, supra note 27, at 8 (arguing that expenditures on avoidance include an
increase in direct costs from operating an illegal enterprise).
57. P.J. O'ROURKE. PARLIAMENT OF WHORES: A LONE HuMORIST ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN
THE ENTIRE U.S. GOVERNMENT 210 (Grove Press 2003).
58. See ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 23.
59. Id.
60. See e.g., Peter Pashigian, On The Control of Crime and Bribery, 4 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 311
(1975). See also ACKERMAN supra note 51, at 9-23 (outlining some of these analyses from the
point of view of a criminal giving a bribe to prevent paying a fine, obtaining a government
contract award, or a criminal paying an official and then blackmailing that official).
61. Once again, "economically rational" only assumes that the government official is acting in
his direct financial interests unconstrained by morals or ethics.
62. The model outlined here assumes that if the official is caught, he nevertheless gets to keep
the bribe. Thus, his expected revenue is always the amount of the bribe. If the punishment
involved giving back the bribe (and the exact amount was detectable) then the bribe would have
to be multiplied by the probability of non-detection. For an example of the difficulty of forcing a
payback of the bribe see e.g.,United States v. Sapoznik, 161 F.3d 1117, 1118 (7th. Cir. 1998).
There, Judge Richard Posner estimated that a corrupt police chief received $500 a month for
four years to help cover up illegal gambling. However, instead of having to pay back the $24,000
bribe ($500x12x4) he was ordered to pay back a restitution of 1/4 of his four year salary. The
damages that he had to pay were the difference in value between the salary of an honest police
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p - probability of detection [p ranges from 0 to 1]
B = bribe amount
Io government official's expected discounted income if he does not
take the bribe
IF = government official's expected discounted income after detection,
if he takes the bribe, and after fine has been paid
F = fine the government official expects, if detected
(1) B = p* Io - p*IF+ p*F
A profit-seeking government individual will demand a bribe:63
(2) B = p* (10 - IF +F)
However, the bribe cannot exceed the mafia's expected profit (Err)
from the venture, so that offering the bribe is still profitable to the
mafia organization. Therefore the total bribe amount is constrained
on both sides as:64
(3) Enr _ B > p* (I0 - IF +F)
As the amount and size of the illegal activity increases, more than
one official will need to be bribed. In fact, as the size and frequency
of the crime increases, officials at different levels will be brought in
and compensated for their assistance. However, at each governmental
level the amount of power, participation, and assistance that the gov-
ernment employee wields is approximately equal to other employees
within that occupational level. 65 For example, two city building in-
spectors for two different city districts wield similar powers and duties.
Moreover, since government salaries and promotional rates are
largely fixed, the expected incomes before and after detection will be
approximately constant across each occupational level. 66 Conse-
quently, since the amount and ability of the official's assistance at
each occupational level will be approximately the same, the bribe that
chief versus that of a corrupt police chief (apparently the value of a corrupt police chief is 3/4 that
of an honest one). Id. at 1121-22. In essence the chief kept the bribe and paid restitution dam-
ages to the city.
63. For simplicity, the amount of power that a government official reaps from his position is
not included in this equation, but it could be quantified and added to the expected discounted
income.
64. This formula is applicable to any enterprise operating within a realm where secrecy or
assistance is required from the government officials to secure the profits of a venture-for exam-
ple, where a business attempts to influence a government official in awarding a contract.
65. See ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 27.
66. At the federal level the government sets out discrete levels which define the official's level
of income-the General Schedule (GS) levels. A GS Schedule can be found at http://
www.opm.gov/oca/06tables/indexGS.asp. A similar trend can be found at each state's level. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division, at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/index.html.
See also ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 80 (describing civil service salary structures in foreign
countries).
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the official at each level will demand will also be approximately the
same (with higher-levels receiving higher bribes). 67
Moreover, for bribees, the probability of being detected will depend
on the occupational level: different occupational levels have different
levels of public exposure and internal scrutiny, while the amount of an
official's participation generally remains equal across the level.
Therefore each variable becomes dependent only on the occupational
level at which the bribe is taking place. Similarly, the expected profit
from a given venture depends on the level of officials that must be
involved to facilitate success; each higher level brings with it higher
protection but also higher costs.
x = factor assigned to government official's occupational level-acting
as a variable in the bribery function
(4) Enr (x) > B(x) > p(x)* (Io(x) - IF(x) +F(x))
Because the bribe's upper limit is the expected profit from the ven-
ture, the total bribe must be equal to or less than the sum of the indi-
vidual bribes across each government occupational level required for
hiding the crime. Assuming the compensation for each official at a
particular level is roughly the same, the individual bribe amounts must
be multiplied by the number of officials being bribed at each discrete
level. Similarly, the occupational level dictates the number of officials
that need to be bribed at that level. For example, a criminal organiza-
tion may need to bribe a whole day-shift of customs agents in order to
pass its drugs through a border, but the same organization could alter-
natively bribe one mayor to turn a town's blind eye and effectively
reach the same result. Depending on the scope of the illicit operation,
the bribe must only go so far up the levels-in a local drug sale only a
single neighborhood cop may need to be bribed, but for a prostitution
ring, the sheriff and the alderman may have to be oiled up.
If:
H = the highest occupational level that will need to be bribed to
ensure the secrecy of the transaction; and
n = the number of government officials in each occupational level
that need to be bribed, the equation becomes:
(5) E-rr(x)_>(x=I-- x=H)I n(x)B(x)_>(x=l--.>x=H)Y n(x) [p(x)*(I0(x)-IF(x)+F(x)]
67. For simplicity, age differences of the officials at each level can be disregarded in equating
their expected discounted incomes. Age differences may account for same level officials de-
manding different bribes because their expected loss from getting fired or jailed is different
depending on how much they have left to live/work.
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Thus, each discrete level "x" will receive a certain amount of the
total bribe (B) multiplied by the number of officials (n) participating
in the illegal activity at each level. The total profit (Tr) that the mafia
reaps from the venture is the expected profit Enr(x) minus the total
bribe TB(x):
(6) TTr(x) = Emr(x) - TB(x)
As the participants' occupational levels rise, the organization must
allocate higher bribe amounts to each participant at the level, with
higher occupational levels having fewer officials. This pyramid alloca-
tion structure demonstrates the increasing investment needed to bribe
high level officials, and leads to a natural ceiling on the size of specific
illegal transactions, unless other secrecy tactics can be made more
efficient.
Theoretically, secrecy tactics are a substitute for bribery. If the or-
ganization can conduct its activities more covertly, then fewer bribes
will have to be expended. However, the mafia already operates at
extremely high levels of secrecy and it is doubtful that further invest-
ment into secrecy tactics can yield profitable results.68
Thus, the ceiling for expansion should be where the marginal bribe
is equal to zero, i.e. where the derivative of the total profit function is
equal to zero. Here, further business expansion yields no profits.
Therefore:
d d d
(7) dx Trr(x) = dx Enr(x) - dx TB(x) = 0
d d
(8) 0 = dx Err(x) - dx (x=l->x=H) I n(x) B(x)
d d
(9) 0 = dx Er(x) - dx (x=l-x=H) I n(x) [p(x)* (I0(x) - IF(X) +F(x)]
At this equilibrium point the derivatives of the expected profit will
equal the sums of the bribes and will be equal to or greater than the
sum of the individual expected costs upon detection summed over the
individual levels and officials within each level.
68. See e.g., GAMBETTA, supra note 11, at 35-6 (describing the mafia's extremely high secrecy
levels and how new recruits are taught to "distrust even [their] parents").
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d d d
(10) T En(x)= a (x=l--x=H)7n(x)*B(x)= ai (x=l---x=H)In(x)[p(x)*(IO(x)-IF(x)+F(x)] 6 9
Consequently, as the mafia expands its operations and its size, it
must employ one or all of the following methods to prevent informa-
tion flow and maintain profitability: bribe more high level officials to
ensure non-detection, increase the level of information monitoring
(i.e. increase the detection and punishment rate of informants or other
information leaks), and/or use higher skilled labor (the relevant skill
being secrecy). However, the pool of such skilled labor is limited and
is usually already employed for other ventures.70
Additionally, while increasing efforts to monitor and "plug" infor-
mation leaks may prevent some information flow, it also costs more,
draws extra attention to the venture itself, and serves as a disincentive
to labor. Not only do murders and disappearances attract outside at-
tention, but "employees" will demand greater compensation when
facing a higher risk of being killed by their own mafia employer.71
Thus, regardless of other secrecy options, continued expansion
mandates increasing bribery payments.72 At equilibrium, therefore,
expansion of illegal ventures will cease to be profitable because the
expected profits will equal the bribe necessary to prevent detection.
As can be seen from above calculations, the bribe necessity serves as
an increasing black market tax which rises with the amount of goods
or services sold, and thereby limits expansion.
D. Laundering Costs
1. Introduction
Because the mafia strives to maximize the return on accrued funds
and capital, it will begin to transform itself into a legal entity when
legal returns on capital become higher. This can happen in one of two
ways. First, the mafia can continue to operate its naturally limited
black market enterprise and, in parallel, invest the profits into legal
69. This formula would also be valid for non-criminal organizations and corporations that use
bribes to secure contracts or avoid penalties in domestic or foreign markets. Cf. ACKERMAN,
supra note 51, at 27 (suggesting that legal entities may use bribes to get favorable government
contracts).
70. See GAMBETrA, supra note 11, at 62.
71. E.g., if the mafia shifts its internal punishment system to punish employees for disclosing
information "knowingly," rather than "negligently," or make the employees "absolutely liable"
for any information disclosure, the probability of mafia punishment increases. A higher risk of
organizational punishment must be compensated by a higher salary. See e.g., LEVrrr & DUBNER
supra note 35 at 106-07 (describing a gang drug dealer's analysis of risk vs. compensation).
72. Higher level government officials will require higher bribes as their risk of detection and
potential loss of income will be higher. ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 30.
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ventures, thereby operating in both spheres and using the legal ven-
tures as a money laundering machine.73 Alternatively, it can invest its
black market profits into legal ventures with higher returns than its
black market operations and exit the black market altogether.74 The
path chosen, largely depends on existing law and its enforcement,
which dictates the expected punishment facing the organization if its
legal venture is found to be backed by an illegal enterprise.
75
Just like a corporation may sell off its less profitable divisions to
concentrate and expand its most profitable ones,76 so too a mafia can
completely exit the constrained black market to focus on more profit-
able legal operations. In essence, the mafia exchanges a low cost start
up enterprise with high natural growth limitations to a high start-up
cost/higher rate of return enterprise with less restrictive constraints for
expansion. A criminal that extorts money using a gun has expended
little and expects a relatively low return. Sometimes he buys a gun for
$100 and he burgles $500; sometimes he gets sent to jail. An organiza-
tion that builds and runs a casino invests large capital into the enter-
prise, but expects high returns. It invests $50 million and in return
gets $500 million, plus the added bonus of staying out of jail or getting
killed.77 Thus, the mafia can serve as an initial vehicle that allows an
expedited acquisition of large amounts of capital needed for a legal,
future, high-return investment.
The alternative to completely exiting the illegal industry is for the
mafia to continue to function as an illegal enterprise and simultane-
ously funnel profits into legal ventures. 78 Money laundering instru-
ments and institutions provide this channel, facilitating the continued
73. Lan Cao, International Money Laundering: from Latin America to Asia, Who Pays? 22
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 59, 67-68 (2004); Michael Levi, Money Laundering and Its Regulation, 582
ANNALS 181 (2002).
74. See infra Part IV.
75. See e.g., Levi, supra note 73, at 182-3 (describing how differences in law and enforcement
environments lead to different incentives for criminal organizations). See also Cao, supra note
73, at 76.
76. See e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Indus-
try, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, And Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 400-
01 (2002).
77. Cf. SooCheong Jang & Larry Yu,, Analysis of Return on Hotel Investment: A Comparison
of Commercial Hotel Companies and Casino Hotel Companies, 26 J. HOSPITALITY & TOURISM
RES. 38-53 (2002),
78. Laundered investments have been found in numerous industries including banks, insur-
ance companies, casinos, shell corporations, trusts, and various money service businesses. Dept.
of the Treasury, U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment (Dec. 2005), at http://
www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcementlpdf/mlta.pdf.
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operation of illegal enterprise.79 In fact, the money laundering busi-
ness is itself a specialty business within the greater sphere of the crimi-
nal world.80 Criminal profits are not truly profits until they are
"cleaned." Dirty money cannot be spent or invested without arousing
too much suspicion as to their origin.8'
A mafia can either launder the money itself or outsource this aspect
to other professional criminal organizations. 82 In fact, even to trans-
form the mafia into a legitimate organization the money must first be
laundered into legal channels. 83 To funnel money into the legal sector
requires a conversion into utilizable financial resources that appear
legitimate.8 4 Thus, money laundering institutions present an incentive
for the mafia to keep its hands in the pockets of both worlds at the
same time: "if the opportunity to pretend that one's wealth is legiti-
mate... can be... denied then motivation for continued crime... is
considerably reduced. '85
Once the laundering process is complete the source of money can
become untraceable and indistinguishable from legal sources.86 It is
estimated that between $590 billion and $1.5 trillion of illegally ob-
tained funds are annually laundered worldwide (two to five percent of
the world's GDP). 87
2. Legislation
In the United States, the centerpiece legislation which imposes
laundering costs is the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), 88 recently supple-
79. See Teresa E. Adams, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531,
552 (2000) quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-746, at 17 (1986) ('There are problems especially for the
large drug trafficking network which has to put volumes of cash generated from street sales of
drugs into something more negotiable than boxes of ten, twenty and fifty dollar bills. Typically a
drug trafficker needs to exchange small bill for large ones .... To accomplish these ends the drug
dealer has to have access to banks and other financial institutions.").
80. Id. at 552.
81. Michael McGuinn, Money Laundering, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 739 (2006).
82. See Adams, supra note 79, at 553 (describing the comments of Assistant U.S. Attorney of
Miami who argues that the entities conducting money laundering activities are a special niche in
the criminal world that assist organized crime in washing their money).
83. See e.g., Volkov, supra note 52 (describing how criminal groups transferred their money
into a large oil company and the group's leader is now the vice president of the large holding
company and has political aspirations).
84. Levi, supra note 73, at 182.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 183.
87. International Monetary Fund & The World Bank, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Combating the Financing Terrorism, Second Edition and Supplement on Special Rec-
ommendation IX (Jan. 20, 2007), at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/
396511-1146581427871/Reference GuideAMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf
88. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2007); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(s), 1829(b), 1951-1959 (2007).
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mented with sections of the PATRIOT Act.89 The BSA imposes cur-
rency reporting requirements for domestic financial institutions and
"know your customer guidelines," which require officers to develop
certain internal policies, procedures, and controls.90 The bank is re-
quired to develop a program that must include the following four
components: (1) a system of internal controls to assure ongoing BSA
compliance; (2) independent testing of the designated financial institu-
tion's compliance; (3) designation of an individual responsible for co-
ordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance; and (4) training for
appropriate personnel.91
Designated financial institutions (DFI) are also required to file Sus-
picious Activity Reports (SARs) on any instances of known or sus-
pected illegal or suspicious activity. 92 To ensure that it can identify
suspicious activity, the DFI must have in place a due diligence pro-
gram under which the organization can assess the risks and gather suf-
ficient information to determine whether a customer account or
transaction warrants the filing of an SAR.93
In addition, Section 313 of the USA PATRIOT Act and its imple-
menting regulations address shell banks (banks created by illegal enti-
ties for the sole purpose of funneling money). 94 These regulations
prohibit covered U.S. banks and broker-dealers from establishing,
maintaining, administering, or managing a correspondent account for
a foreign shell bank.95
Additionally, RICO makes it unlawful for a person to use an enter-
prise to launder money generated by a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.96 This is the classic mafia investment case envisioned by Congress
where organized criminals gain control of an uncorrupted business by
89. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5301-77 (2007) (particularly §§ 5318-19).
90. 31 U.S.C. § 5314(h) (2007). The BSA requires banks to establish and maintain effective
anti-money laundering programs, implement customer identification programs, and maintain
transaction records. Banks also are obligated to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000 as
well as transactions that appear suspicious. Id.
91. Dept. of the Treasury, U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, supra note 78.
92. Id. DFIs must implement a written customer identification program appropriate for their
size, location, and type of business. Id. The procedures are supposed to enable a bank to form a
reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of each customer. Id.
93. Id.
94. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2007).
95. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2007). In addition, U.S. banks and broker-dealers must take reasonable
measures to ensure that any correspondent account that they establish, maintain, administer, or
manage for a foreign bank is not being used by the foreign bank to provide banking services
indirectly to a foreign shell bank. Dept. of the Treasury, U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assess-
ment, supra note 78.
96. Lightening Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1187-88 (3d Cir. 1993).
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investing profits from gambling or other illegal activities.97 Moreover,
RICO makes it illegal to have control of or interest in an enterprise
engaged in racketeering activity, to participate in such an enterprise,
or to conspire to do any of these actions.98
The BSA, PATRIOT ACT, and RICO statutes have been supple-
mented with vigorous enforcement by the Department of Treasury
and heavy penalties for banks not following the Acts' procedures. In
a recent action against AmSouth Bank, the bank consented to pay $50
million to the United States government for failing to develop a
proper BSA compliance program and for helping to funnel money for
various politically exposed persons (Chilean dictator Augusto Pi-
nochet was one of these). 99
3. Laundering Despite the Legislation
Despite these regulations, money laundering continues to prevail in
the United States and throughout the world.100 As the government
imposes more restrictions on private monetary institutions, the money
launderers have increasingly turned to informal avenues of money
transfer systems that exclude banks altogether, and do not fall under
the reach of the above statutes.10 1 Moreover, banks oppose invading
the confidentiality of their clients, and many see these restrictions as
unduly burdensome. 102 Some banks have even made it a point to be-
come the "no questions asked" dealers, and to locate offshore so as
not to fall under the jurisdiction of U.S. laws.10 3
4. Summing Up the Costs
Money laundering fees serve as a tax on illicit profits and like most
costs they can be at least partially passed on to the consumer (both
legal and illegal customers). Laundering is reported to be expensive
to the criminal organization and its costs have risen since the 1980s
with the establishment of new laws and special international task
97. Id.
98. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 577 (1981), citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976 ed.
and Supp. I11).
99. In the Matter of AmSouth Bank, AL Dept. of Banking 2004.
100. McGuinn, supra note 81, at 740.
101. See Cao, supra note 73, at 73-8 for a discussion of informal norms and avenues of money
laundering.
102. Virginia Boyd, Financial Privacy in the United States and the European Union: A Path to
Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 939, 943 (2006).
103. See Michael Levi & Peter Reuter, Money Laundering, 34 CRIME & JUST. 289, 351-54
(2006).
20071
398 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
forces charged with watching transfers of large sums of money across
the world.1 04
During the 1980s, laundering costs ranged from 6-10% of the total
profit of a given venture, and are reported to have been between 15-
30% in the 1990s and 2000s.105 Laundering fees depend largely upon
the amounts needed to be transferred, and vary with government en-
forcement and prosecutorial capabilities, availability of laundering in-
stitutions, and expected punishments upon detection. 10 6 For example,
on a $2.25 billion annual profit by a drug cartel the estimated costs of
money laundering are $350 million or approximately 15.6% of the to-
tal profits.107
These laundering fees can thus be accounted for by subtracting
them from the pre-laundered gross profit to yield the final profit. The
final laundered profit is then the expected profit less the bribery costs
(BC) (as, for example, derived in section 111(C)) and less the launder-
ing costs (LC): (11) FTr = Eur - BC - LC
E. Agency and Information Monitoring Costs
An organization that cannot optimally adjust to its expanding size
and operations suffers inefficiency and agency costs.' 08 Like other
business entities, the mafia is organized in a hierarchical structure to
allow for the flow of information between its ranks, maintain com-
mand and control, and fulfill its profit maximization function. 10 9 Ad-
ditionally, the mafia must stay under the radar of law enforcement-
the benefits that a legal corporation reaps from its bureaucratic, open,
and vertical structure are a detriment to the mafia. The mafia requires
quick horizontal control and high secrecy; lots of people and lots of
paperwork make for easy prosecutions.' 10 The mafia must therefore
keep its size below a certain level, centralize its control while main-
104. See Levi, supra note 73, at 191. The International Monetary Fund lists the following costs
for banks associated with laundering operations: loss of profitable business, investigation costs
and fines, asset seizures, loan losses, declines in stock value, as well as others. Anti-Money
Laundering, supra note 87, at 11-4.
105. Morais, Andrea, Money Laundering in Brazil; see also Echeverry, Juan Carlos, Colom-
bia and the War on Drugs, How Short is the Short Run, Documento CEDE 2004-13, Universidad
de los Andes (2004), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/col/001050/002142.html.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A Theory of the Firm 47 (Harvard University Press 2003).
109. Demleitner, supra note 22, at 618. E.g., the American-Italian mafia was modeled along
the lines of a Fortune 500 company-the organizational chart of a crime family or syndicate
mirrors the management structure of a corporation; see also Jankiewitz, supra note 45, at 221; see
also SALERNO & TOMPKINS, supra note 49.
110. See GAMBETrA, supra note 11, at 35-6. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 14.
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taining a decentralized management structure, keep its upper decision
making ranks buffered from the lower executing ranks, 1 ' and obtain
obedience from its subordinates through a reward or a threat of force
or death.112
The inefficiencies generally suffered by legal corporate entities are
in large part opposite to those suffered by mafia organizations. In a
legal corporation the most prevalent agency problems are (1) a corpo-
rate culture that substitutes friendliness and politeness for truth; (2)
information flow problems due to large corporate size; (3) legal liabil-
ity for board members which forces them to minimize downside risk
for stock prices rather than maximize corporate value; (4) lack of eq-
uity holdings by management; and (5) oversized boards that are
modeled after a political democracy.1 13
Conversely, the mafia incentive structure presents few if any of
these issues. (1) The control culture concerns itself least with polite-
ness.11 4 (2) The size of the organization is kept small to avoid detec-
tion.1 5 (3) "Shareholders" are unable to use the legal system to bring
suits against management. (4) Management and administrators have
large equity and profit sharing interests in the organizations.11 6 And
(5) control of the organization is concentrated and authoritarian.' 17
Rather the mafia's major inefficiency lies in its less-than-optimal
size. 118 Many legitimate companies alleviate some of these problems
through methodical, hierarchical structuring, vertical reporting, and
business consulting. But because of secrecy concerns, these avenues
are largely unavailable to the criminal organization. 1 9 At once, the
111. Buffering is another cost minimization technique which works by isolating the managing
ranks from the executing ranks. This makes prosecution difficult because the managing ranks
can assert that they lacked knowledge of the crime, if detection occurs.
112. See GAMBETTA, supra note 11, at 35, 40, 43, 66.
113. Jensen, supra note 108, at 49-53.
114. See GAMBETrA, supra note 11, at 40, 68.
115. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14.
116. LEVITr & DUBNER, supra note 35, at 108-14; GAMBETrA, supra note 11, at 60-63.
117. Id.
118. See e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 14 (arguing that organized crime is analogous, not to a
giant corporation, but to something more like a chamber of commerce or better business bureau
for the criminal market). See also LEvIrT & DUBNER, supra note 35, at 108 (arguing that a study
of the Chicago drug gang and its national board of directors revealed that drug gangs within the
greater structure of organized drug distribution function more like franchises than corporate
entities. For example, there were only 3 levels of hierarchy (gang leader, people reporting di-
rectly to the gang leader, and street soldiers) between the board of directors and the lowest rank
and file.).
119. Lawyers do perform some legal consulting duties. Jankiewicz, supra note 45, at 260 n.40
(describing a lawyer as a link between organized crime and legitimate business). Nevertheless,
illicit businesses cannot acquire professional business, management, or strategy consulting advice
from the marketplace.
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mafia structure must be small enough to avoid authorities and mini-
mize monitoring and bonding costs, 120 yet large enough to have spe-
cialization of tasks for its members, utilize economies of scale,121 and
allow management control over subordinate activity. 122 In other
words, bosses must ensure that associates are acting in the best inter-
ests of the organization (monitoring costs) and that they will not
switch to a rival mafia (bonding costs). Simultaneously, the organiza-
tion must be large enough to operate at low cost (by utilizing econo-
mies of scale) and, at the same time, not get caught. "TPS reports"
may make good accountability tools, but they make wonderful
prosecutorial evidence as well.
Thus, the predominant set up of criminal organizations across the
world is much like that of a franchise operation: small firms enjoying
the specific trademarks and visibility of a larger structure, organized
along territorial lines under a board of directors consisting of some or
all of the individual firm leaders, within an effectively cartelized indus-
try.123 The smaller criminal organizations are awarded significant in-
dependence in their operations, but may have to pay licensing fees to
the larger cartelized criminal organization.124 These arrangements in-
clude Italian mafia families under the umbrella of the "Commis-
sion, ''125 Chicago territorial drug gangs paying licensing fees to a
board of directors, 126 Japanese Yakuza gangs that report to the
oyabun (boss), 127 and even the Russian mafia cells' 2 8 (which currently
120. Bonding costs are incurred to assure that an employee stays with the mafia. For example,
ensuring that a "boss" does not switch his employment to another mafia family. One way that
mafias minimize such costs is by only allowing specific ethnic groups into their mafias to ensure
loyalty to the organization. See, e.g., Diego Gambetta, Mafia the Price of Mistrust, in TRUST:
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 158-175 (Diego Gambetta ed., 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/gambettal58-175.pdf.
121. Cf. Braguinsky, supra note 19, at 532-533 (emphasizing that the mafia is able to offer
protection as a service because the organization is so large and effectively competes with the
large state. Utilizing economies of scale, he advocates imposing a large centralized state backed
organization that would provide protection service and could undercut criminal protection rack-
ets because of cost advantages).
122. GAMBEl-rA, supra note 11, at 62.
123. Cf FRIEDMAN, supra note 118.
124. Id.
125. See GAMBETTA, supra note 11, at 101.
126. LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 35, at 99.
127. Milhaupt & West, supra note 43, at 66.
128. FEDERICO VARESE, THE RUSSIAN MAFIA: PRIVATE PROTECTION IN A NEW MARKET
ECONOMY 170 (2001) (describing the organizational structure of the Russian mafia group as all
too reminiscent of an Italian Mafia family). Groups called brigades are organized among territo-
rial lines, the leader of the brigade is surrounded by six to eight people, not more, directly under
his control ("otherwise the structure becomes too difficult to manage"), below them are the crew
leaders and under them are the foot soldiers: shestiorki. Id. Each brigade comprises of 1,000 to
9,000 individuals, yet crews operate with a degree of independence within each brigade. Id. The
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have much less enforcement and prosecution to worry about from the
state than their Italian, Japanese, or American counterparts).
F. Costs of Prosecution and Other Costs
The obvious cost for the mafia, that most legal organizations do not
incur, is that of government prosecution. If detection occurs, the gov-
ernment can levy heavy fines, seize property, and of course, send "em-
ployees," "supervisors," and "bosses" to jail. Since paperwork on how
to run the organization is scarce and relationships with customers and
suppliers are heavily trust-based and therefore leader-centric, a seri-
ous disruption in the organization can occur as a result of a successful
prosecution. 129
Other costs exist for the mafia that may or may not exist for a legal
organization. One is the cost of competition with other illegal entities.
This includes, for example, the costs of security, property loss from
competitor raids, and loss of labor through murders and force. Addi-
tionally, such competition causes inefficiencies in management result-
ing from the killings of top officials, prevention of hostile takeovers by
competing entities, forced sharing of profits, and territorial disputes
with other illegal entities in the cartelized industry. 130
Another cost is increased risk compensation. For example, salaries
of mafia employees have to be higher to account for employee legal
opportunity costs and to reimburse for the increased risk.13' Mafias
are also unable to obtain legitimate capital. Thus even where the ma-
fia organization can obtain investment capital, the returns must be
higher than the market rate to account for the increased levels of risk
brigade's leadership is controlled by the Supreme Council which is headed by the 12 leaders of
the strongest crews. Id. at 171. Disputes between the brigades are arbitrated by respected crime
lords known as vori v zakone. Id. at 170-2. The head of the Russian Interior Ministry Depart-
ment for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, Nikolay Ovchinnikov, stated that approxi-
mately 100 criminal fraternities, with a core membership of 3,500-4,000, are currently operating
in Russia. Ministry Spokesman Presents Report on Organized Crime in Russia. BBC WORLD-
WIDE MONITORING, February 15, 2005.
129. See Jacobs & Gouldin supra note 45, at 157-9.
130. Gambetta, supra note 120, at 158.
131. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 43, at 62 (incomes of Japanese lower level mafiosos in
1993, ranged between $30,000-$100,000. For comparison, the average yearly contract earnings of
all employees for the same year was $33,504 - the average dentist earned approximately $65,000,
while janitors earned $30,000). Id. See also LEvIrr & DUBNER, supra note 35, at 104 (noting
that the salary of a drug dealer must be higher or at least seem higher to account for the higher
risk of getting killed or going to jail). Levitt argues that while an entering gang drug dealer
makes less than $2/hour-significantly less than an entry level McDonalds employee-he is com-
pensated by tremendously higher profits if he can advance up the level of the organization. If
not promoted to higher ranks the drug dealer quits the illegal business altogether within a few
years. Id.
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and detection as well as the decreased supply of capital.1 32 Finally, the
mafia also incurs transactional costs such as security protection, weap-
ons, warehouses, safe houses, and false fronts. 133 On the other hand,
somewhat like their legal counterparts, criminal businesses expend re-
sources to secure the goodwill of the community in which they
operate.134
The next section integrates and analyzes the above-described costs
and revenues to determine the effect the law plays in the threshold
transformation.
IV. WHAT ROLE DOES THE LAW PLAY IN FACILITATING THE
THRESHOLD AT WHICH THE MAFIA WILL ATTEMPT TO
TRANSFORM INTO A LEGAL BUSINESS?
Enforcement of the law is performed through two different ave-
nues, by the interested victim and by the disinterested actors of the
state. While it is generally inefficient to have private entities enforce
criminal laws,135 private entities with specialized knowledge of the
crime serving as witnesses are extremely efficient in fostering prosecu-
tion.136 The law as a whole provides criminal and civil punishment to
parties involved in the criminal organization as well as incentives for
injured parties to bring suit.137
When the mafia organization faces the law and its enforcers, it may
react in a number of ways. First, it can attempt to circumvent the law
by altering its practices. Thus, when the law prohibits importation of
cocaine, the mafia can invest in research and development of new
drugs that are not yet prohibited by law such as "crack" or "ecstasy,"
or invest in sidestepping importation barriers by growing or making
the drug in the country itself. American mafias, for instance, took this
132. See Gambetta supra note 11, at 230 (describing the Sicilian mafia's inability to obtain
capital especially in "smuggling where large sums are required to buy the goods and pay for
ships, motorboats, and crews.... Investors are reluctant to entrust their money to risky busi-
ness. Since confidence in criminals is low, the mere promise of exorbitant returns is hardly
sufficient incentive.").
133. See ABADINSKY supra note 15, at 120-180 (describing many of the businesses that the
Mafia is involved in and the costs that it incurs).
134. See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 35, at 98 (describing how a drug gang purchases com-
munity goodwill by providing money and support for families of the community and that of
murdered members). See also Milhaupt & West, supra note 43, at 65 (describing how Japanese
crime firms engaged in public relations when the deadly earthquake struck Kobe in 1995 - it was
a mafia firm, not the government, that was first to bring food and water relief to devastated
neighborhoods).
135. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 309-18 (discussing other countries and historic periods
where private individuals enforced criminal laws).
136. Pamela Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002).
137. See generally id.
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route with popular sex drugs named "poppers." When legislators out-
lawed a specific chemical composition, the producers reformulated the
drug so it had the same net effect, but fell outside the specific
legislation.' 38
Alternatively, the mafia can break the law directly but prevent its
enforcement through monetary incentives to the enforcers-bribes.
As previously mentioned, bribes to legislators, judiciaries, and police
officials are a common and time-proven way to maintain market pres-
ence and deter prosecution.1 39
A third option is to set up the organization in countries with a
favorable environment for such criminal activity. Utilizing this tactic,
from the 1970s through the late 1980s various drug cartels operated
almost freely from Nicaragua, Cuba, Panama, and Columbia, where
the legal environment was filled with sympathetic and well-bribed pol-
iticians. 140 The drug prosecutors in the United States were able to
catch drug mules and distributors, but were unable to reach the upper
levels of the cartels themselves.1 41
Finally, with the advent of a new law the mafia can decide that it
would be more profitable to invest its resources, influence, and struc-
ture into legal ventures. This was the case when, following Prohibi-
tion in the United States, criminal enterprises exited the recently
legalized alcohol industry and invested their capital into the legal
sphere.' 42
A. United States: RICO
1. RICO's Background
Congress has passed a number of acts attempting to deal with crimi-
nal organizations, 43 yet none has been as successful as RICO at at-
tacking the "criminal enterprise" itself.' 44 Until the 1970s, organized
crime had a significant presence in the United States. 45 Criminal
138. Paul Varnell, Poppers Less Than Meets the Eye, Windy City Times, Mar. 30, 1989; see
also Simon Sheppard, Speaking of Poppers What are They?, at http://www.gay.com/health/sexual-
ity/article.html?sernum=77 0 .
139. See ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 76; see also infra Part III(C).
140. Guy GUGLIOTrA & JEFF LEEN, Kings of Cocaine: Inside the Medellin Cartel (1989).
141. Id.
142. See infra Part V(A).
143. For an excellent summary of many of the crime fighting tools in the United States' arse-
nal see Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Law and Procedure: Anti-Racketeering Legislation in
America, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2006). These laws include the Hobbs Act, the Controlled
Substances Act, various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, The Bank Secrecy Act, The
Money Laundering Control Act, and the PATRIOT Act. Goodwin supra note 47, at 292-93.
144. Goodwin, supra note 47, at 293.
145. Id. at 289.
2007]
404 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
charges were hard to press, especially when some witnesses turned up
dead, while others, fearing reprisal, refused to testify. 146 The mafia
heavily enforced its code of secrecy-the Omerta-across the ranks,
resulting in a lack of information about the organization. 147 In fact,
the most common way of convicting mafia criminals was through the
use of deportation regulations, traditional murder and conspiracy
laws, and fraud statutes.148 This amounted to "culling the herd" by
targeting the weak, low-level members and allowing more efficient
gangsters to take their place, while the organization persisted. 149
Even when higher level officials were convicted, the organization
would be wounded, but would nevertheless still live on. Just like a
legitimate enterprise, the mafia survives because of its business organ-
ization and product, rather than a life or death dependence on man-
agement, shareholders, or boards of directors. 150
2. RICO's Features
Fearing the rapid growth of crime, Congress, in 1970, passed the
Racketeering In Corrupt Organizations Act as Title IX of the Omni-
bus Organized Crime Control Act. 15' The trademark features of the
Act were that it reached beyond the person committing the illegal ac-
tion to the enterprise and the key bosses involved that activity. The
prosecutor had to show that the enterprise had committed a pattern of
specific racketeering activity (two or more predicate acts). 152 The in-
vestigation would be carried out by a special racketeering investigator,
and funds seized in racketeering trials would be put into a separate
fund for future RICO prosecutions and investigations. 153 In addition,
RICO contained the first criminal forfeiture statute in American his-
146. Jacobs & Gouldin, supra note 45, at 131.
147. See Goodwin, supra note 47, at 290.
148. See ABADINSKY, supra note 15, at 182.
149. Goodwin, supra note 47, at 292.
150. Demleitner, supra note 22, at 617 (1994) (arguing that organized crime, just like legiti-
mate enterprises, survives as an institution independent of management, majority shareholders,
or board of directors. Consequently the distinctive feature of organized crime is "not its players
but rather the illegal nature of the product and/or service."). Id.
151. See Organized CRIME Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), Pub. L. No. 91-452, §901, 84 Stat.
941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68). (Congressional Statement of Findings and
Purpose).
152. The government must prove 1) the commission of two or more racketeering acts, 2) a
pattern, 3) an enterprise, 4) an effect on interstate commerce, and 5) that the accused act is
prohibited. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2007). The two predicate acts must occur within a ten year period.
However, there is no requirement that the defendant be convicted of such activities, nor are
prosecutors prohibited from using prior convictions as predicate acts. Goodwin, supra note 47,
at 293-94.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2007).
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tory allowing the seizure of property-particularly money-obtained
from a pattern of racketeering activity. 154
With the advent of RICO and diligent prosecution, organized crime
in the United States diminished rapidly in the 1970s and 80s, and in
the 90s its demise was further aided by prosecution of the New York
and Chicago mafias. 155 In fact, successful prosecutions of the heads of
La Cosa Nostra families (called Dons or Godfathers) have triggered
reference to the "twilight of the Godfathers."' 156 Entire organizations
have been dismantled, and mafia influence over many legitimate in-
dustries has been eliminated.157 It has been stated that some mafia
families have disappeared entirely, and others have dwindled to as lit-
tle as ten to fifty percent of their size thirty years ago. 158
Through these features of the Act, the United States attempted to
raise the costs of illegal activity by holding each member of a criminal
enterprise responsible for all of its acts and reducing the profits that
could be reaped. In a large sense RICO's "draconian punishments"
forced higher monitoring and secrecy costs onto the mafia and forced
many established illicit enterprises to exit the industry.1 59 Secrecy has
become so crucial to surviving enterprises that in the United States,
unlike many other countries, murders of state authorities have been
rare-largely out of fear of the backlash that would result. 160 In sev-
eral mafia families, killing a state authority is strictly forbidden-even
conspiring to commit such a murder is punishable by death.1 61 Since
even one security breach can now cause serious damage to the whole
enterprise (rather than one person or one division) there is no room
for leaks or mistakes.162
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2007).
155. Ed Magnuson, Hitting the Mafia, TIME, June 24, 2001; see, e.g., United States v. Go-rri,
771 F. Supp. 552, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993);
see also United States v. Rainone, 32 F.3d 1203, U.S. 32 F.3d 1203, 1209 (1994); see also Jacobs &
Gouldin, supra note 45, at 132; see also Goodwin, supra note 47, at 303-04.
156. Goodwin, supra note 47, at 281.
157. Id. at 280-02
158. Id. at 280.
159. Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When is Everything Too
Much?, 53 U. Pmrr. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991).
160. GAMBETrA, supra note 11, at 9.
161. Id. One mobster, Dutch Schultz, was reportedly killed by his peers out of fear that he
would carry out a plan to kill New York City prosecutor Thomas Dewey. See Robert M. Pitler,
Independent State Research and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals'
Quest For Principled Decisionmkaing, 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 73 n.262 (1996).
162. For example punishments imposed on John Gotti, the 'Don' of the Chicago-based mafia
organization, were both internal and external. John Gotti, nicknamed the "Dapper Don" for his
show-off attitude and "Teflon Don" for his ability to evade federal charges, had fireworks set for
him when he was acquitted in his first large-scale prosecution. Goodwin, supra note 47, at 303.
Yet, many members of his organization and fellow mafia organizations became extremely un-
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B. Other Countries' Laws
Following the United States' success with combating organized
crime, other countries have established a mixture of laws that parallel
and emulate the RICO statute.
1. Russian Federation
In post-Communist Russia, there was and continues to be a lack of
enterprise-based law. The mafia is thought to be intertwined with the
top levels of government, and its annual revenue in 1998 was esti-
mated at $200 billion, the highest of any crime group in the world.1 63
The first Russian Federation law was a carryover from the Communist
era when the government denied the existence of organized crime and
racketeering, 164 even though anywhere from ten to forty percent of
Soviet GDP stemmed from underground sources.165 Legislative infra-
structure that could combat organized crime, such as banking laws,
insurance laws, securities regulation, a RICO statute, laws against
money laundering and a witness protection program, had not been
adopted. 166 Conspiracy and criminal laws attacked individual fraud
and criminal acts but did not extend to the whole enterprise. 167
In 1994, when organized crime was thought to control as much as
forty percent of all of the Russian Gross Domestic Product and
threatened the stability of the society and government, 168 then Presi-
dent Yeltsin issued a decree to combat organized crime.169 This de-
cree allowed for the deportation of undocumented aliens from the
capital, enabled the government to interrogate suspected persons
prior to instituting criminal proceedings against them and to use the
evidence gathered, in later proceedings; and inspecting an individual's,
happy with his tactics of putting organized crime in the spotlight. Id. When he and the organiza-
tion he controlled were brought down by the FBI in 1993, his own mafia employees attempted to
take his life. Id.
163. Newman, supra note 42, at 227.
164. Daniel McGrory, Symposium: Economic, Legal, and Political Dilemmas of Privatization
in Russia: Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements and Prospects for Estab-
lishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 89 (1995).
165. Id. at 71.
166. Louise Shelley, Development of the Democratic Institutions & The Rule of Law in the
Former Soviet Union: Article: Post-Soviet Organized Crime and the Rule of Law, 28 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 827, 835 (1995).
167. Mike Cormaney, Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View: RICO In Russia: Ef-
fective Control Of Organized Crime Or Another Empty Promise?, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 261, 294 (1998).
168. Eugene Solomonov, US Russian Mutual Legal assistance Treaty: Is There a Way to Con-
trol Russian Organized Crime?, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 165, 175 (1999).; see also Milhaupt &
West, supra note 43, at 41.
169. Solomonov, supra note 168, at 237.
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or his or her relatives', or co-residents' records of financial activities
and transactions, without the obstacles of banking and commercial
confidentiality requirements. 170 Additionally, anyone suspected of
being a part of a criminal organization could be denied bail or de-
tained for up to thirty days without formal charges.' 7 ' Moreover, gov-
ernment officials could inspect buildings and premises of enterprises,
institutions, and organizations suspected of criminal activities.172
In 1996, the Russian State Duma (Congress) adopted the first post-
Soviet Russian Criminal Code which contained provisions to punish
leadership, creation, or participation of a stable armed group for the
purpose of assaulting individuals or organizations, 173 as well as special
provisions for individuals using their official government positions to
participate in such groups.174 Additionally, the Criminal Code cre-
ated penalty provisions for organized criminal organizations partici-
pating in grave or especially grave crimes.' 75
Yet the code failed to provide a vehicle through which to deal with
"large and diverse organizations" because it did not attack the "crimi-
nal enterprise.' ' 176 Instead of focusing on the man behind the cur-
tain-the organization behind the crimes-it targeted the individuals
committing crimes. As a result, prosecutors were unable to hold a
member liable for crimes of other members of the organization unless
they shared a specific common goal and agreement. This presented a
large problem for the immense, multi-faceted business of the Russian
mafia. 177 Moreover, for all of its specifically outlined powers, enforce-
ment of the law remained low. For example it was reported by news
agencies that 100,000 people belonging to 9,000 organized criminal
groups were under surveillance by Russian law enforcement authori-
ties but could not be arrested due to the lack of sufficient evidence
necessary for their indictment.178
170. Id. at 188-90.
171. Id. at 188.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 192 (citing Ugolovniy Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii, No. 63-FZ of June 13, 1996, as
amended on June 25, 1998, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 25, Item 2954. For an English transla-
tion of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, see CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION (William E. Butler trans., Simmonds & Hill 2d ed. 1998).
174. Solomonov, supra note 168, at 192.
175. Id. at 193.
176. Newman, supra note 42, at 238.
177. Id.
178. Solomonov, supra note 168, at 197-8 (citing Tanya Frisby, The Rise of Organized Crime
in RussiA: Its Roots and Social Significance, 50 Europe-Asia Studies 27, 40 (1998)).
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Murders of high level government officials were common and fears
of government reprisals ran low.' 79 In 1997, then President Yeltsin
struck down an attempted witness protection law leaving witnesses
with little hope of being protected. 180 Moreover, the mafia heavily
enforced its own code of secrecy and victims did not sell out their
friends to the law because, as some victims put it, "they are more
afraid of the police than they are of the mafia. ' 181 Bribery and infor-
mation leaks at government levels were widespread. In 1994, after the
murder of several high ranking officials, then President Boris Yeltsin
instituted a one-time top secret operation to round up suspected mafia
leaders-Operation Hurricane. 182 But, on the day of the operation
most of the suspected mafiosos were found to have recently left the
country on vacation-the "hurricane" left virtually no damage.18 3
And yet, as the mafia grew in size and influence during this apparent
lawlessness, it began, almost on its own, to convert to the legitimate
sector as will be explained in section V(B).
2. Italy and the Cosa Nostra
Prior to the mid-1990s, the Italian mafia-the Cosa Nostra-ex-
erted immense influence in Italy's legal, economic, and political
spheres. 184 Institutional acceptance, political influence, and a lack of
government prosecution allowed the Cosa Nostra to flourish. 185 Until
1982, much like in early 90s Russia, Italy's laws against the mafia fo-
cused on preventing individual crimes. 186 Only in 1982 did Italy begin
to deal with organized crime. From 1982 to 1992, 114 laws regarding
organized crime were passed. 187 The general trend was to fight organ-
ized crime on the basis of the presence of three elements: the associa-
179. Newman, supra note 42, at 252.
180. Solomonov, supra note 168, at 197-8.
181. Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy 42
(2005).
182. Jeff Trimble, Enemies of the People Once Again?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT WORLD
REPORT ON RUSSIA, July 18, 1994, at 39; see also Jonas Bernstein, Yeltsin's Crackdown On Or-
ganized Crime Hits Only Little Guys, THE WASH. TIMES, June 25, 1994, at A7.
183. See Jonas Bernstein, Yeltsin's Crackdown On Organized Crime Hits Only Little Guys,
THE WASH. TIMES, Moscow, June 25, 1994, at A7.
184. Benjamin Scotti, RICO vs. 416-bis: A Comparison of U.S. and Italian Anti-Organized
Crime Legislation, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 155 (2002). According to a chief
prosecutor at a salient mafia trial, the MAFIA IS "the only organization in the world that could
exercise its power over a legal state." Id.
185. Id. at 155-6.
186. Id. at 156-7.
187. Umberto Santino, Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against Mafia and Organized
Crime, in CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 151 (William F. McDonald
ed., 1997), available at http://www.centroimpastato.it/publ/online/mcdonald.htm.
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tive bond (the power of intimidation that stems from being associated
with the organization), the organized structure, and the criminal pro-
gram (various enumerated crimes that the mafia commits). 188 In addi-
tion, the law in Italy now allows for pentiti or leniency for those
criminals that repent and turn state evidence.' 89 Also, Article 240 of
the Italian Penal Code has a forfeiture provision providing for "confis-
cation of any proceeds of any crime."' 190
However, the majority of Italy's mafia fighting tools are still con-
centrated on conspiracy-based actions. For example an often used
law-Article 416 of the Criminal Code-punishes conspiracy between
individuals that are part of mafia style organizations, or that promote
or manage such associations, or that use intimidation.' 91 This has led
to many of the problems associated with pre-RICO U.S. crime tools:
inability to pursue the entire criminal organization on the basis of the
organization's goals and context, inability to implicate high-ranking
leaders due to established buffers between layers of the group, and
inability to charge sufficient members of an organization in order to
incapacitate the organization as a whole. 192 Section V(C) will show,
however, how the Italian mafia also began converting to the legal sec-
tor during this time.
V. EXAMPLES OF MAFIA TO BUSINESS TRANSFORMATIONS
This section assesses the legal and economic atmospheres present
when national mafias of the three countries described in Part IV
(United States, Russia, and Italy) transformed to legal entities. By
analyzing costs and benefits as derived in Part III, and applying the
laws delineated in Part IV, this section takes a focused look at why the
metamorphosis took place in the life of each country's mafia. Finally,
it derives several major principles which can be used to predict when
criminal organizations will rehabilitate and avenues through which the
government can aid and accelerate this conversion.
A. Prohibition/Casinos
The law is a two way street. Prohibition of a good or service creates
criminal organizations and solicits underworld elements. Legalization
188. Id. See also ORGANIZED CRIME IN EUROPE: CONCEPTS, PATTERNS AND CONTROL POLI-
CIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND (Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli eds., 2004).
189. MARCO JACOUEMET, CREDIBILITY IN COURT: COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES IN THE CA-
MORRA TRIALS, 53 (1996).
190. 1982 C.P. 240; see also Santino, supra note 187.
191. Scotti, supra note 184, at 160.
192. See Id. at 160-1.
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on the other hand forces underworld elements out and brings in effi-
cient operators who are not good at secrecy, but know how to run a
business.193 In the prohibited market, the illicit organization's rele-
vant skills are not providing the good or service efficiently, but rather
providing it secretly. For example, in 1909, Nevada passed a law mak-
ing all gambling illegal; yet, rather than diminishing, the practice only
became more discreet.194 Instead of eliminating gambling, the new
law attracted underworld gamblers skilled in the arts of cheating and
bribing public officials. 95 Not only was public revenue from licensing
lost, but games without any controls were developed and public offi-
cials became corrupted. 96
Likewise in 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment hurled the country
into an era of Prohibition forcing liquor sales underground. 197 With
the advent of this tremendous new black market, legal distilleries and
businessmen were rapidly substituted by organizations skilled in se-
crecy and bribery. 198 But as soon as Prohibition ended in 1933, the
organized criminal elements in charge of the alcohol market were
quickly replaced by business organizations having no ties to the crirmii-
nal world, as well as bootleggers who converted to the legal side. 199
The U.S. experiment with Prohibition allowed a quick conversion of
mafia funds into legal ventures.200 Legalization of alcohol brought in
competition by more efficient producers and forced the mafia to exit
the alcohol industry altogether, as their secrecy skills were no longer
needed.20' In fact, a similar tactic was later used by the United States
to drive out the Italian Mob from the waste management business-
the government flooded the market with efficient producers that com-
peted with the mafia on the basis of cost.20 2 In sum, when the Prohibi-
193. BECKER, supra note 27, at 23. Suppliers of illegal goods generally differ from those who
would produce them if they were legal. See also infra note 194.
194. JEROME SKOLNICK, HOUSE OF CARDS: THE LEGALIZATION AND CONTROL OF CASINO
GAMBLING 106-07 (1978).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
198. Demleitner, supra note 22, at 622.
199. Id. See also Guillaume Fournier, From Alcohol Prohibition to Regulation, THE SENLIS
COUNCIL (2002), at http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/from-alcohol-prohibition-to-
regulation; see also PBS Special: Las Vegas an Unconventional History, July 11, 2005, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/lasvegas/peopleevents/p-syndicate.html.
200. Demleitner, supra note 22, at 627.
201. See Becker supra note 27, at 23 (explaining that illegal producers have higher production
costs than legal producers when the good or service is not prohibited by the law).
202. Jacobs & Gouldin, supra note 45, at 175-6. New York created a Trade Waste Commission
which issued licenses to companies involved in construction projects. Id. Only those companies
that had no ties to the criminal world were given licenses. Id. Additionally, the Commission set
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tion ended, the crime syndicates found themselves precisely at the
metamorphosis point: large amounts of capital, a vibrant legal market
in gambling, lowered or almost non-existent legal barriers to entry for
illegal capital, and higher returns in the legitimate sector than in the
illicit sector.20 3
Las Vegas presented the perfect avenue for conversion. Casino
gambling was a proven industry with sky-high returns that sought high
investment capital, and lacked legislation and enforcement to prevent
infusion of illicit funds.20 4 As one legislator in Vegas said in response
to accusations of illicit capital in casinos, "Las Vegas is a place for fun,
we don't run detective agencies here. 120 5 It is estimated that between
the end of Prohibition (the forced exit from the previously illegal alco-
hol industry) and 1957 (when tougher legislation and enforcement af-
fecting gambling was enacted), hundreds of millions of mafia capital
was put into building Las Vegas.206 This included $6 million for the
Flamingo Hotel, $40 million in "permanent loans" by Jimmy Hoffa
and the Teamsters Union pension fund, and various other investments
spread among 17 hotel casinos. 20 7 Thus, the high profits reaped from
bootlegging allowed some mafia organizations to exit from illicit mar-
kets altogether and use the accumulated capital to inadvertently ad-
vance the public sector. As a result, the large influx of capital brought
with it significant private and public economic benefits.20 8
B. Russian Mafia Transitions into State and Business
In the past fifteen years Russia has presented a paradigm of organ-
ized crime mutating into legal business. Criminal leadership appears
to have been an avenue for rapid social advancement and many legal
maximum rates and regulated contract duration. Id. This allowed legal suppliers to enter the
construction market and compete with the mafia dominated ones. Id. The success has been
overwhelming driving crime-ridden companies from the market, allowing national waste-hauling
companies to enter the market, and dropping waste hauling prices by 30-40%. Id.
203. See SKOLNICK, supra note 194, at 112. From 1931 to 1949 barriers to entry were negligi-
ble. For example, from 1931 to 1945 the granting of licenses was purely the responsibility of
local and county officials who treated the matter as a tax gold mine. Id. at 114. From 1945 to
1949 the applicants did not need to apply for a license on the casino until two weeks before the
casino was ready to open-to deny the license at that point, when the casino was nearly com-
pleted, investment was substantial, and loans had been committed, was tantamount to revoking
it. Id. Not until 1955 did Nevada form a gaming commission to regulate investment of illicit
funds. Id. at 115.
204. Id. at 112-15.
205. SKOLNICK, supra note 194, at 76.
206. Id. at 112-15.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, LEGALIZED GAMBLING: A REFERENCE HAND-
BOOK, (1994).
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businesses are now based on funds acquired on the black market and
led or controlled by formerly criminal elements.209
The collapse of Communism transferred national economic assets
into private control, but failed initially to provide property rights and
relevant institutions to secure these assets. 210 Organized crime had
largely assumed the role of contract enforcement as well as concen-
trating the transferred economic assets in certain private hands.211
For example, in the mid 1990s approximately seventy percent of all
contracts were enforced without any participation from state organs;
the mafia had taken over this responsibility. 212 In addition, highly ed-
ucated and knowledgeable individuals paired with individuals edu-
cated in secrecy and use of force, and together set up illicit
businesses. 213 The chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union thus
provided a fertile ground for mafia business:2 14 a highly educated la-
bor force, government officials with sizeable power seeking bribes and
shares in illicit businesses, lack of property rights, an enormous mar-
ket seeking the mafia's services, and justice and police mechanisms
devoid of power.215
Yet, during the later part of the 1990s, legal institutions and en-
forcement mechanisms were built and strengthened and economic as-
sets became more dispersed.216 Additionally, property rights were
increased and secured. 217 This led to the costs of operating in the
black markets and (more importantly) the rewards of operating in the
209. Volkov, supra note 52, at 4.
210. Id. at 1.
211. Because the speed with which property was being allocated was greater than that of
institution-building, the emerging markets "spontaneously developed alternative mechanisms of
protection and enforcement. These involved various private groups and agencies that managed
organized force: criminal groups, private protection companies, informal groups of state security
employees, and various semi-autonomous armed formations attached to the state "power" min-
istries." See id.
212. Id. at 2.
213. See id; see also Shoshanah V. Asnis, Controlling the Russian Mafia: Russian Legal Confu-
sion and U.S. Jurisdictional Power-Play, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 299, 308 (1996).
214. See Achim Wennmann, The Political Economy of Transnational Crime and its Implica-
tions for Armed Violence in Georgia, in Conference Proceeding 6, The Illusions of Transition:
Which Perspectives for Central Asia and the South Caucasus, GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL STUDIES (IUHEI), GENEVA, SWITZERLAND 105 (2004), available at, http://
www.cimera.org/sources/105-117.pdf.
215. See generally, VARESE, supra note 128.
216. Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance American Legal Models
and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. Irrr'L ECON. L. 179,
185-7 (1999).
217. See, e.g., Brandon Bennett, Secured Financing in Russia: Risks, Legal Incentives, and Pol-
icy Concerns, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1445-47 (1999).
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legal market to increase drastically.218 As a result, organized criminal
structures started to exit the crime industry and establish a solid pres-
ence in the legal sphere.2 19
This has caused the criminal organizations to transform into legal
business enterprises that play by formal rules, engage in capital invest-
ment and charity, and behave more risk-aversely than their criminal
progenitors. 220 For example, the most powerful criminal group in the
St. Petersburg region, Tambovskaya, invested in the oil business and
created a large holding-Petersburg Fuel Company.22' The leader of
the group became its vice president.222 Most of the notorious criminal
leaders who have managed to survive government prosecution and
territorial wars have turned into respectable capitalists with political
aspirations. 223
As state and private security agencies improved contract enforce-
ment and private rights, many notorious crime organizations moved
from the black to the white market. The elite of the formerly power-
ful criminal groups accumulated substantial capital and sought com-
promise with official authorities who are badly in need of
investments.224 The formula became: "we respect the law and invest
money in the legal economy; you let us be."225
C. Sicilian Construction Industry
In Italy where the term "mafia" originated, a similar trend was seen
between in the mid-1980s and mid to late 90s. Prior to the 1980s, Ital-
ian criminal organizations had deeply infiltrated all facets of Italian
infrastructure including, and especially, the construction and transport
trade.226 In the 1940s, the mafia had helped the Americans with the
invasion of Sicily and it had retained the status of a "protector of the
people. '227 Fearful of the communist threat, many politicians and a
sizeable share of the populace tacitly supported the mafia as a way to
218. Volkov, supra note 52, at 2.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. This included, e.g., the owner of Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Factory (former boxer A.
Bykov), as well as the founding father of the Solntsevskaya criminal group (Moscow entrepre-
neur S. Mikhailov).
224. Id. at 4.
225. Id.
226. Federico Varese, How Mafias Migrate: The Case of the 'Ndrangheta in Northern Italy, 40
L. & Soc'y REV. 411, 427-8 (2006).
227. MARTIN J. BULL & JAMES L. NEWELL, ITALIAN POLIrics: ADJUSTMENT UNDER DURESS
106 (Polity Press 2005).
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prevent the Reds from infiltrating the country.228 After the war, the
mafia conducted its business through a protection racket in the poor
countryside, where state influence was minimal.229 However, after the
1960s the mafia relocated to cities to participate in and take over the
construction boom which the nation was experiencing.
230
The mafia's power was so complete that in the 1970s and early
1980s all business contracts relating to their areas of operations in-
cluded a fifteen per cent fee for the "Mafia risk. '231 By estimates, the
mafia had more wealth than Exxon-the largest American corpora-
tion at the time.232 The mafia acquired many construction businesses
and forced their way into many construction contracts. In Palermo
(and many other cities), for example, one can notice a plethora of
unattractive buildings, roads that lead nowhere and overlap on them-
selves, and a lack of green parks and efficient parking areas-the ma-
fia built nearly half of that city.233
Until the early 1980s, the State's response had been minimal and
pedagogical-commissions convened for years, analyzed a mass of in-
formation, but concluded little of anything and purposefully over-
looked the roles of politicians in assisting the mafia's growth.234 In
1982, the impetus to deal with the mafia increased for several reasons.
For one, General dalla Chisea who had been given the job of defeat-
ing the mafia but then denied the resources that he requested, was
murdered after only four months in the fight.235 This provoked a mas-
sive civil protest which prompted the government to pass stricter con-
spiracy and criminal organization laws and increase police
enforcement. 236 Additionally, the government started a major anti-
mafia campaign headed by the lead prosecutor Giovanne Falcone,
leading to the so-called Maxi-trial in 1984 where 473 defendants, in-
cluding almost the entire mafia's leadership were tried.2 37
By the late 1980s, the push to stop the mafia had dampened, the
investigations had ceased and even though more than 300 guilty ver-
dicts were passed in the Maxi-trial, many of the convicted were re-
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Varese, supra note 226, at 417-8.
231. BULL & NEWELL, supra note 227, at 107.
232. Id.
233. Diego Gambetta & Peter Reuter, Conspiracy Among the Many: The Mafia in Legitimate
Industries, in THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIME 166 (Gianluca Fiorentini & Sam Peltzman
eds., 2004), available at http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/reuter/gambetta.pdf.
234. BULL & NEWELL, supra note 227, at 108.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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leased on appeal and the trial had become discredited. 238 Yet In 1989,
the drive for reform had once again caught fire and the Judiciary
headed by now Judge Falcone, began conducting intensive systematic
investigations into the Sicilian mafias and bringing criminals to tri-
als.239 Additionally, the collapse of communism and totalitarianism
across the world destroyed the mafia's image as a protector and re-
duced support for their collaboration with government officials. 240
Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church, which had tacitly supported
the mafia, finally came out of the closet on the issue.241 Furthermore,
the increased internationalization of the world brought in much higher
competition from the Russian Mafia, Colombian Cartels, Chinese Tri-
ads, and Japanese Yakuza, reducing the available profits.242 Finally,
the assassination of Judge Falcone in 1992, helped galvanize the coun-
try into fighting the mafia, forced the Italian government to send in
the Army, and led to a number of political reforms including those
making it harder for government officials to be bribed.243
What is interesting to track, for the purpose of this article, is that
the movement of mafia enterprises into the legal realm followed al-
most in parallel with the increased prosecutions, reforms, and compe-
tition. Many small and large mafia families exited the organized crime
racket altogether and established themselves as legitimate business-
men during the mid 1980s and then once again in the mid-1990s. 244
Hundreds of millions of dollars acquired through illegal means were
transferred over to the legal sphere with this metamorphosis. 245
238. Id. at 108.
239. MARK GILBERT, THE ITALIAN REVOLUTION: THE END OF POLITICS ITALIAN STYLE? 39
(1995).
240. BULL & NEWELL, supra note 227, at 109.
241. Rod Usher, Heat on the Mob, TIME INT'L, June 3, 1996, available at http://www.time.com/
time/international/1996/9606031mafia.html.
242. See CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon, International Legal Mechanisms for Combating Trans-
national Organized Crime: The Need for a Multilateral Convention, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 53,
56 (2000). While globalization provided opportunities for international mafia cooperation, it
also put the mafias at odds with each other. See Cao, supra note 73, at 65-6.
243. Barry James, Meanwhile: Over Sicily, the Mafia Casts a Grim, Persistent Shadow, May 13,
1999, INT'L HERALD TRIB., available at http://www.iht.comlarticles/1999/05/13/edjames.2.t.php.
244. See SEE NAPLES AND DIE: THE CAMORRA AND ORGANIZED CRIME 178 (2002) ("the
very availability of large amounts of money which arrive continuously, favours the faster and
faster conversion of a [mafioso] into a businessman"); see also e.g., TOM BEHAN, THE CAMORA,
51, 90, (1996); see also Santino, supra note 187.
245. For example, $280 million alone were invested by the Nuvolleta gang during the 1980s
into such varied sectors as agriculture, cleaning contracts, construction, and leisure industry, THE
CAMORRA supra note 244 at 90-1.
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VI. PROPOSAL: MAKING THE JUMP/DETERMINING
THE THRESHOLD
Thus, when all is said and done, the criminal organization strives for
the same thing as the legal business organization-maximum profit-
ability-lower costs and higher profits. When a legal business be-
comes more profitable than an illegal one, the transformation occurs.
This section will synthesize and build upon the previous five sections
to propose and analyze specific solutions that increase the costs of a
criminal organization, lower the revenues, and raise the incentives for
a full transformation into a legitimate corporation.
The migration of criminal enterprises to the legal sphere, uncovers
the economic range where the benefits of being a legal business enter-
prise outweigh the benefits of being a criminal organization. Putting
aside legalization of the good or service, 246 the analysis in the sections
above evokes seven major factors that generate this transformation:
(1) increased costs of illicit business; (2) decreased profits from illicit
transactions; (3) co-existence in both legal and illegal spheres becomes
unprofitable for the enterprise; (4) the enterprise accumulates the
minimum amount of capital necessary to enable financing a legal ven-
ture; (5) strong protection of private property rights through legal
channels; (6) a high legal market return on investment; and, perhaps
most importantly; (7) the transformation of the economic enterprise
can be accomplished with relative ease.
A. Costs of Illegality and What the Law Should Do
1. Introduction
Increasing the costs of the criminal enterprise is the first step in
facilitating the transformation. 247 The main area the law should strive
246. There have been many excellent economic and social works written on how legalization
of some goods or services (e.g., drugs) could actually ameliorate the situation. See, e.g., Fried-
man, supra note 50; see also Becker, supra note 27 (arguing that fighting a war on drugs by
legalizing drug use and taxing consumption may be more effective than continuing to prohibit
the legal use of drugs). However, it does not appear that legalization will occur any time soon,
so this article will set that issue aside.
247. There is a nice fictional illustration of this point in a science fiction story by Poul Ander-
son, summarized in FRIEDMAN, supra note 14. "There is a potentially profitable trade route
connecting two groups of stars which runs through the territory of an empire ("Borthu") which
seizes passing starships, confiscates their cargo, and steals their crews. The trading corporations
could, if they wanted to, get together, build warships, and defeat Borthu. Doing so, however,
would cost more than all of the profits to be made on the trade route. They could also arm their
trading ships-but the cost of building and manning an armed ship would exceed the profit the
ship would make. They could win-but, being rational profit maximizers, they won't. The prob-
lem is solved [by an economist] as follows: arm one ship in four, reducing the profit but not
eliminating it. Warships carry larger crews than merchant ships. Three times out of four, Borthu
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to increase is the secrecy costs. The other costs of a criminal enter-
prise are easier to determine and are generally the normal focus of
legal punishment and enforcement: e.g., destroying drug labs (raising
fixed costs); increasing the rate of prosecution of racketeering thugs
(increasing production costs); imprisoning drug mules, which in turn
raises their salary requirements (raising distribution costs).
The criminal business' secrecy costs, conversely, are by their very
reactive nature hard to uncover. Criminal businesses outsource part
of their secrecy to third parties who are more efficient at maintaining
the veneer, i.e., government officials who can conceal the illicit act.
This outsourcing market is not very competitive-often bribery nego-
tiations occur in a bilateral monopoly and there are only a few offi-
cials that can get the job done.248 Therefore, the law should raise the
costs for criminal organizations to identify and bribe these officials.
The law should also strive to decrease the profits that can be reaped
from illegal business ventures. In addition to the strategies for de-
creasing demand (just say no campaigns) or for decreasing supply (de-
stroying cocaine fields), the law should be focused on attacking the
mafia's realized profit by increasing the costs of laundering the illegal
profits. This section will address the various costs that the law should
endeavor to raise for the mafia.
2. Increasing Detection Costs
First, increasing the possibility of detection can be accomplished by
using police agents as informants within the government organization
itself and/or utilizing "sting" tactics to send agents to government offi-
cials to offer bribes.2 49 These tactics would elevate the corruption de-
tection rate and make it costlier for officials to accept bribes. The
government could also pay higher salaries to government officials
thereby increasing the expected losses in case of detection.250 Alter-
attacks a trading ship, capturing it and its four-man crew. One time out of four, the trading ship
is armed; Borthu loses a warship and its twenty-man crew. Every four attacks cost Borthu, on
net, eight crewmen. Piracy is no longer profitable, so it stops. The logic of the problem, and the
solution, is nicely summed up in [the economist's] reply to one of his colleagues, who suggests
that they should fight even if it costs more than the trade is worth to them. "Revenge and de-
struction are un-Christian thoughts. Also, they will not pay very well, since it is hard to sell
anything to a corpse. The problem is to find some means within our resources to make it unprof-
itable for Borthu to raid us .... [Tlhey will then stop raiding and we can maybe later do busi-
ness." FRIEDMAN, supra note 14 (citing POUL ANDERSON, Margin of Profit, in UN-MAN AND
OTHER NOVELLAS (1972)).
248. ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 123 (1999).
249. Id. at 56, 58.
250. Id. at 78-9. Cf. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974) (advocating compensation of enforcers to
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natively, bribery funds or properties could be seized in addition to
fining the official for the transgression. 251 Another solution is to in-
crease the risk of detection for officials by minimizing administrative
discretion and eliminating arbitrary decision-making. An official who
has to follow regulatory codes, and can be monitored through objec-
tive standards, has much less autonomy and can be of much less help
concealing a mafia's transgression. Consequently, this goal can be ac-
complished through an adoption of an administrative procedure
code. 252 Finally, rewards and amnesty should be offered to govern-
ment officials who come forward with information on bribery within
the government organization (raise the benefits of detection and de-
fection on the bribery and decrease the expected income after
detection).
3. Increasing Monitoring Costs
Second, the law should also be structured to increase monitoring
costs within the criminal organization itself; this in turn leads to in-
creased agency costs. As the United State's experience during the
1970s showed, introduction of incentives for individuals within crimi-
nal organizations to inform on their organizations can be a useful
tool.2 53 Such incentives as the witness protection program, reduction
of sentence for a confessing witness, and infiltration of federal agents
within the organization can greatly raise the costs of running a crimi-
nal organization. 254 Employees of the criminal enterprise may make
the best and most efficient tools in forcing criminal enterprises to take
have three components: "an 'entrance fee' equal to the temptation of malfeasance, a salary pre-
mium in each year of employment approximately equal to the income yielded by the 'entrance
fee' and pension with a capital value approximately equal also to the temptation of malfea-
sance). As it were, enforcers post a bond equal to the temptation of malfeasance, receive the
income on the bond as long as they are employed, and have the bond returned if they behave
themselves until retirement. Id. Put differently they forfeit their bond if they are fired for
malfeasance.
251. See supra note 62 and surrounding text, for a description of how bribe amounts are cur-
rently not being seized.
252. See e.g., Daniel Gregory, Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements
and Prospects For Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 65, 88 (1995). Here, one must be careful, however, to balance the benefits from tighter
regulation with the resulting increase in bureaucratic inefficiency; lest we need more bureaucracy
to maintain the expanding bureaucracy.
253. Jacqueline E. Ross, Impediments to Transnational Cooperation in Undercover Policing: A
Comparative Study of the United States and Italy, 52 AM. J. CoMP. L. 569, 584 (2004).
254. Id. E.g., Donnie Brasco was a famous FBI agent who infiltrated the Sicilian mafia for six
years, and pulled out just before he was going to be killed. Jacobs & Gouldin, supra note 45, at
132. The information he gathered was invaluable to the war on the Cosa Nostra in the United
States. Id.
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higher information precautionary measures, thereby raising the enter-
prise's costs.
In fact, the incentives for confession and "turning" can be raised by
allowing the employees more than just a "get out of jail free card" for
crushing the cabal. Providing amnesty and monetary incentives (such
as a flat fee or a portion of the civil damages of the enterprise) can
help to destabilize the enterprise by providing quick monetary gain to
anyone willing to blow the whistle on the illegal activities of the enter-
prise. Such qui tam actions have been used successfully to weed out
illegality in corporate law and have been theorized for application to
anti-trust law. 255 Employees who are in the criminal organization are
in the most efficient position to gather information on the illegal en-
terprise and at the same time have much to lose if someone else con-
fesses first. It is indeed strange that such an efficient method has
rarely, if ever, been used to increase the costs of the criminal
organizations.
4. Increasing Laundering Costs
Third, another increase in costs for the enterprise must come from
increasing the laundering costs for criminal profits. Profits are not fi-
nal until they are laundered. Yet the BSA and PATRIOT Act laws
have misplaced the incentives for banks to turn in criminal elements
that utilize banking channels.256 The misalignment is between the
government, which seeks to prevent the laundering, and the financial
institution, which directly profits from it. Thus, the resources the bank
devotes to checking the origins of each transaction will be inversely
proportional to the amount of financial transactions they will do. The
less they have to monitor the transactions the more business they can
conduct.
The above laws have attempted to deal with this misalignment by
imposing criminal penalties on banks that participate in transferring
illegal funds.257 Yet, this imposes what is in essence an ex-post fine
(Pigouvian tax) on financial institutions that fail to catch the illegal
entities that utilize their financial networks. Such externally imposed
fines may not lead to social optimality. On the one hand, banks may
(and do) over-invest resources in investigation even where such inves-
tigation is not necessary. 258 On the other hand, banks may under-in-
255. Bucy, supra note 136, at 56-7, 62.
256. See BSA and Patriot Act in supra notes 88-90.
257. Id.
258. See e.g., Dept. of the Treasure, U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, supra note
78 (the number of SARs filed by depository institutions from 1996 through 2003 increased on
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vest resources out of concern for their clients' privacy-higher
promises of privacy will likely attract higher capital.259 Thus, the low
standard of proof and the ex-post quality of the fine reduces predict-
ability and may both over and under deter client monitoring by the
bank.
This efficiency problem could be resolved by providing a financial
incentive to banks to monitor for potentially illicit funds. A monetary
reward or a qui tam action could be granted to financial institutions,
by paying them a portion of the funds which are seized in a successful
prosecution of money launderers. For example, allowing the bank to
retain the amount that it would have made in profits from the transac-
tion with illegal funds (or more than that to account for the risk of
under-detection) would allow the bank to devote the optimal re-
sources to catching criminal-based transactions. Increasing such in-
centives to banks and other informal banking institutions would make
money laundering prevention more efficient, by motivating banks to
invest the resources necessary to find the illicit elements.
B. Pinpointing and Facilitating the Transformation
Most importantly, a successful metamorphosis will take place when
the management of an illegal business can be confident that reseeding
its resources into the legal sector will be worthwhile and unpunished.
Because the risk that the illegal nature of the funds will be uncovered
always looms, criminal enterprises may be hesitant to transfer all of
their resources into the legal sphere until they know that their invest-
ments will not be seized.
1. The Transformation Principles
Looking at the economics and history of criminal organizations,
three incentive principles emerge that fertilize the transformation and
can help predict when it will sprout.
First, when the nature of the switch from illegality to legality is mi-
nor and the risk of detection of the illegal funds in the legal business is
low, the criminal enterprise will have a large incentive to transform.
This was the case in Sicily when mafia-controlled construction compa-
nies simply stopped the illegal part of the business (e.g., racketeering,
average by more than 25% annually. FinCEN indicates much of this increase may be attributed
to "defensive filing" by financial institutions, in which SARs are filed on nonsuspicious transac-
tions out of concern about regulatory and criminal scrutiny. Such defensive filing dilutes the
value of the information in the BSA database.).
259. See McGuinn, supra note 100, Cao, supra note 101, and surrounding text (discussing
banks that orient themselves to safeguard their clients' privacy regardless of the BSA).
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falsifying contracts, bribing contract issuers) but maintained the legal
business of construction.260
Second, when law and enforcement mechanisms strengthen the se-
curity of property rights and at the same time increase detection of
illicit activities, criminal organizations will have an incentive to shift to
legal industries. This was the case in Russia-years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union criminal laws were strengthened, property and
commercial laws were fortified, administrative regulations to prevent
bribery were issued, and the rate of insider informants increased. 261
Russian mafias exited the underground and transferred their wealth
from criminal channels into lawful business and politics. 262
Third, a criminal enterprise will transform when there is a change in
laws that forces a well capitalized criminal industry to look for other
means of investment, while legal industries are simultaneously also
looking for investment without setting high standards of due diligence
as to the source of the funds. This was the case during the 1930s and
40s when the American Prohibition had ended and the mafia pulled
the funds created selling alcohol and reinvested them into casinos.263
An underlying factor of this principle is the entrance of efficient, legal
businesses into the illicit organization's prior-to monopoly market.
This was the case when alcohol became legal after the Prohibition and
when the New York waste-management industry became competi-
tive.264 When mafias have to compete with legal companies to sell
their product they will look to transform into the legal sector.
2. The Amnesty Provision
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the law can be structured so
as to provide a one time amnesty provision (a safe harbor) for enter-
prises that wish to rehabilitate. This would be accomplished by a uni-
form, one-time pass, allowing the illicit organizations to invest their
money and efforts into legal channels. They would only be permitted
to do this if they can show that they have fully exited the illicit indus-
try. Just as the law allows criminals to rehabilitate by taking on legal
jobs and integrating into the legal sphere, so too, it can offer a chance
for rehabilitation to a criminal business.2 65 The alternative is hoping
260. See infra Part V(C).
261. See infra Part V(B).
262. See id.
263. See infra Part V(A).
264. See supra Part V(A); see also supra note 202.
265. Of course criminals that are caught are first punished and are only then rehabilitated.
The fact is, however, that the criminal organization has not been caught (otherwise it would not
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to catch the enterprise in the next act, something that has clearly not
worked before or the enterprise would have already been behind bars.
Offering full economic-rehabilitation presents a chance to integrate
the enterprise's resources into the public sphere, while preventing the
enterprise from committing another illicit act.
Thus, society would extend the incentive of profitability in the legal
sector to the enterprises, so long as the transformation from an illegal
cabal to a legal business is full and complete. At the same time, the
law would heavily punish, both, mafias and legal enterprises financed
by laundered funds, seizing accumulated capital and property of such
organizations. 266 Additionally, the law would increase the rate of de-
tection for criminal enterprises by extending monetary incentives and
safe-harbors to insider-informants. The law must also be carefully
structured to ensure that the amnesty does not serve as an incentive
for advancing criminal businesses to work towards a legal business as
a goal-entering the criminal tunnel to get to the lawful light at the
end. It should, therefore, have provisions to offer the amnesty uni-
formly, only once, and for a limited time period. For example, every-
one would have from January 1st to May 31st to convert. This should
serve as a rehabilitation incentive for those multitudes of organiza-
tions teetering near the threshold of the "finish line," but afraid to
make the jump for fear of punishment. At the same time it would not
serve as a new incentive for potential entrants to the race.
3. Issues of Concern
In essence, then, the law would provide a carefully structured one-
time safe-harbor gauntlet-elimination: all but the most efficient crimi-
nally secret businesses are demolished, while the ones that cannot be
caught (the ones that have made it through the gauntlet) are given a
safe harbor if they become legitimate and their resources are inte-
grated into the public sector. Since the timing of the amnesty is lim-
ited and random and is only presented once, it will not provide an
incentive for budding criminal organizations to become the most effi-
cient for next time-because there will not be a next time.
be in existence) and so no punishment is put forth. The rehabilitation offered is thus pre-
emptive.
266. While all laws punish the wrongdoer to some extent, criminal laws dealing with organized
crime should be increased in enforcement and punishment. In addition to the ultimate goal of
eradicating crime, the augmented penalties can also be justified because the criminals are given a
parallel rehabilitation alternative.
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a. What Happens to the Vacuum Left Behind?
One issue to contemplate may be that the transformation of the
most efficient illegal organizations into legal ones would leave a vac-
uum for providing the illegal goods or services, which someone else
would fill. Like the mythical hydra, if the law chops off one head,
another will grow back since "for every Mafioso arrested there are
another 10 desperate men ready to take his place. '267 First, as ex-
plained above, the proposed law and enforcement changes would not
increase new entrants into criminal activities; in fact the increased
penalties would dissuade some of the men meandering in the shadows.
Moreover, when a criminal organization undertakes the transition
under the shield of the amnesty provision, it will (and should be
forced to) reveal a plethora of information about its past criminal
activities.
This will allow the law enforcement mechanism to learn about the
structure of the underground product or service; which will in turn
preclude similar mistakes when it takes the fight to the next criminal
organization. Additionally, structured criminal organizations take a
long time to build. They must be built slowly, carefully, and co-
vertly.2 68 The created vacuum, if there is one, would hence stand va-
cant for some time-the men waiting in the shadows would have to
build a brand new organization from the ground up, in the place of the
transported one. Meanwhile the law would continue to be amelio-
rated to secure property rights, increase punishment, and build up a
legal and enforcement infrastructure where the product or service was
being illicitly provided.
Finally, and notably, the newly transitioned organizations would
themselves act to prevent another head from re-growing where theirs
sprang out. First, the newly infused wealth would create jobs thereby
increasing the economic status of the region (as mentioned above,
growth of criminal organizations is inversely proportional to a region's
economic success). Second, economic stability is important for a busi-
ness' growth; the newly formed lawful organizations would thus seek
to enforce stability to grow their own business. For example, when
Sicilian and Russian criminal enterprises transitioned into legal chan-
nels, they attempted to break up the corruption and bribes going on
the illicit side of that business. Additionally, the newly legitimized
leaders of these organizations often seek political offices. Because il-
267. Usher, supra note 241.
268. While some criminals can quickly respond to demand increases for an illicit good, organi-
zations that must survive past the initial creation of the demand are much slower to develop and
branch out.
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licit organizations often compete for political and administrative con-
trol, the newly elected political leaders will attempt to eradicate these
shadow organizations in order to secure their own power.269 Thus, the
newly created environment resulting from the transformation of a ma-
fia into legality should substantially diminish a reemergence of new
criminal organizations in its stead.
b. Does a Precedent Occur That Encourages Future Crime?
Another issue that may arise is that even though the amnesty is
supposed to be a onetime offer, it could still be taken as a precedent.
If it were, it would extend the hope to potential criminals that in the
future another amnesty would be granted. Then illegal activity might
even be encouraged, the criminals hoping to transition into a legal
enterprise later.
This concern can be eliminated by ensuring that the one-time provi-
sion of the amnesty is explicit and enforced. Furthermore, the am-
nesty granted at the present point is a carrot, which carries with it an
elongated stick comprising harsher punishments, stricter detection,
and better law enforcement mechanisms. Criminal organizations take
a long time to build. In the process they can be discovered and de-
stroyed, especially with the above suggested improvements in the law.
The mere hope that in the distant future a criminal may be able to
become a legal businessman is unlikely to significantly increase the
drive or profitability of forming or joining an illicit organization today.
c. Is the Law's Moral Power Questioned?
Besides simply making an activity illegal, the law often carries with
it a moral condemnation of improper behavior. Stealing is not only
wrong because a statute says so, but also because society considers it
morally illicit. Thus, an objection could be raised that by providing
amnesty to criminals, society is, at least implicitly, condoning the ma-
fia's illegal activities. As a result, offering criminal organizations a
blank slate promotes disrespect for the law and undercuts the moral
high-ground from which policy is supposed to be administered.
269. As a parallel, terrorist organizations that are legitimized within a nation will often pursue
and eradicate other terrorist factions that were once their friends in order to secure their own
power. Political and economic legitimacy and the goal of attaining more power and money force
the once-illicit organization to align its goals with that of the law. So long as a strong and proper
infrastructure exists that prevents the corruption of the government itself (e.g., the Constitution,
democratic elections) the organization should not be able to seize power, but will instead amelio-
rate society.
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However, offering people and organizations a blank slate does not
condone the activities that they conducted beforehand. In fact, the
law recognizes the maliciousness and illicit character of the mafia's
offenses and provides heavy penalties and punishments for the actions
(when the criminals are caught). Yet, simply because someone had a
troubled past does not mean that they cannot convert and become a
productive part of society. The amnesty provision rests on economic
grounds, and its surrounding provisions express disdain for illicit
behavior.
Additionally, one must consider the alternative. Sitting perched on
the Great Wall, closing one's eyes, and pretending that the barbarians
are not at the gates because we are a nation of laws will not save the
city if the arsenal of weapons used is ineffective. Mafias prevail and
flourish in various countries, they siphon and waste valuable societal
resources, and they will likely continue to exist despite law enforce-
ment's best efforts, unless something is done. Some civilized nations
are simply unable to deal with their internal barbarians because they
refuse to acknowledge their existence or continue to grasp on to the
hope that eventually mafias will come over to the bright side because
that is "the right thing to do." Yet the fact remains, criminal organiza-
tions within a nation have not been lassoed and continue to
perpetuate.
Without an incentive to convert, even stronger punishments by
themselves are unlikely to stamp out criminal organizations, especially
because there is only so much that today's civilized nations will do
before questions of civil liberties arise. Under this article's proposal,
the government will continue to communicate a consistent moral
scorn towards illegal action, while making an economic decision to
prevent many more future violations. The phantom cost is letting
some crimes remain unpunished; but one must remember that most of
these crimes would never be punished at any rate-the government
has no way of collecting enough evidence to prosecute them. Al-
lowing barbarians through the gates so long as they leave their swords
outside and enter wearing a business suit, recognizes the economic
and legal reality and acts to change societal welfare for the better.
VII. CONCLUSION
Thus, the transformation of illegal organizations into legitimate en-
terprises is most likely to occur when either one or all of the following
occurs: (1) the nature of the switch to legality is minor and the risk
that illegal funds are detected is low; (2) property rights are secured;
(3) detection of illegal activities intensifies; and (4) a legal change
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brings in competition from legal or illegal entities in the mafia's indus-
try and compels the well capitalized criminal industry to search for
other means of investment.
The law can facilitate, encourage, and even induce such a transfor-
mation by (1) increasing the secrecy costs of illicit activity; (2) provid-
ing economic incentives to enforcers (e.g., police, banks, witnesses,
insiders, government officials) to turn in the illicit organization; (3)
constructing legislative instruments to combat organizational crime
and money laundering; (4) noting sizeable accumulation of capital in
the hands of illicit organizations indicating their readiness to trans-
form; and most importantly (5) structuring a way to quickly and effi-
ciently transfer this capital into legal ventures.
We do not need to kill and eliminate all illegal businesses and every
individual within those enterprises. The costs to society would be too
much. Rather we should make it unprofitable for the existing entities
to remain illegal and convert their resources to the public sector. Ex-
pediting this metamorphosis can help worms transform from their
dark underground cocoons into beautiful butterflies that pollinate le-
gitimate fields.
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